

PHILEBUS



SOCRATES

PROTARCHUS

PHILEBUS

SOCRATES: Do look, Protarchus, at what kind of speech you're right now going to take over from Philebus,¹ and to what kind in our care, unless it is being said to your way of thinking,² you're going to take a stand in opposition. Do you want us to recapitulate each of the two? 11A B

PROTARCHUS: Yes, of course.

SOCRATES: Well, then, Philebus claims that to enjoy, pleasure, delight,³ and all that is consonant with this genus is [a] good⁴ for all

The text is basically Burnet's, but the readings of the manuscripts are taken from Diēs's edition. All serious departures from Burnet are noted. Square brackets are used in the translation for either an alternative meaning or what has not been supplied in the Greek but has to be understood.

1. It is not known who either Protarchus or Philebus was. Philebus is a rare name in Greek at any period, and it does not occur at all in Classical Greek. It means "Lover of Youth," and Socrates alludes to this at 16B, 46B, and 53D.

2. The expression *kata noun* is literally "according to mind" or "according to reason," but, idiomatically, if it is coupled with the dative personal pronoun as here, it hardly differs from "according to your (my, his) inclination." In the *Symposium*, e.g., even though Aristophanes has denied any connection whatsoever between eros and mind, he grants at the end, in light of the improbability or rather impossibility of meeting up with one's true other half, that the second best is to get a beloved *kata noun* (193c5–8): there is no way that *kata noun* can be translated without falsifying Aristophanes' speech.

3. Of these three terms for pleasure, the infinitive *khairein* (to enjoy) is common in Plato (122 times all told and twenty-five times in the *Philebus*). *Hēdonē* (pleasure) occurs 244 times in the *Philebus*, but the corresponding verb *hēdesthai* is relatively rare (fifteen times in the *Philebus*, twenty-eight times elsewhere). *Terpsis* (delight) is the rarest, twice in the *Philebus* (here and at 19C) and twice elsewhere (*Phaedrus* 239A and *Laws* 669D); the corresponding verb *terpein* occurs six times in Plato and once in the *Philebus* (47B). We know from Aristotle *Topics* 112b21–26 that Prodicus tried to distinguish between joy (*khara*), delight (*terpsis*), and cheerfulness (*euphrosunē*); and, in the *Protagoras* 337C, Prodicus distinguishes *hēdesthai* from *euphrainesthai* by assigning to the former corporeal pleasure and to the latter the pleasure of thought and understanding (for the Homeric usage, see J. Latacz, *Zum Wortfeld "Freude" in der Sprache Homers* [Heidelberg, 1967]).

4. The bracketed "a" is to call attention to the ambiguity in this assertion since it is possible to take "good" for "the good," "a good," or simply "good." One would certainly expect that, at the beginning of the dialogue, "good" would have the article, but its absence would seem to indicate that the argument is tightened and restructured with the replacement of Philebus by Protarchus.

C animals. The stand we are taking in opposition is that it's not these things, but, we say, to be thoughtful,⁵ to think,⁶ to remember, and, what's akin to them, right opinion and true calculations prove to be better than and preferable to pleasure, at least for everything capable of sharing in them; and to be capable of participation is, for all the things that are and will be, the most beneficial of all things.⁷ Is it not in a way somewhat like this, Philebus, that each of the two of us speaks?

PHILEBUS: It's as certain as anything, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Do you then accept, Protarchus, the speech you're now being offered?

PROTARCHUS: To accept is a necessity, for the beautiful Philebus has given up on us and failed to go the distance [the limit].⁸

SOCRATES: Must the truth about them, then, in any way possible be brought to a limit at some point or other?

D PROTARCHUS: Indeed it must.

SOCRATES: Come then, besides this, let's settle between us on this further agreement.

PROTARCHUS: Which?

SOCRATES: That each of the two of us will now try to display some kind of state and disposition of soul capable of supplying to all human beings a life that's happy. Is this the way it is to be?

PROTARCHUS: In just this way.

SOCRATES: And don't you all say it's the state and condition of enjoyment, and we in turn of being thoughtful?

PROTARCHUS: This is so.

E SOCRATES: But what if something else and superior to them shows up? Won't it be the case that while, if it comes to light as akin to

5. *Phronein* is always translated "to be thoughtful," but the cognate noun *phronēsis* is always "thought," not "thoughtfulness," since the latter would confine the word too much into the Aristotelian orbit of prudence and practical wisdom. In Plato, there is not so rigid a distinction between the theoretical and the practical as one finds in Aristotle's vocabulary.

6. *Noein* is always translated "to think" or "to conceive" and its corresponding noun *nous* "mind," except in the phrase *kata nous*. *Noein* can be used in the Aristotelian sense of intellection, but it is not restricted to the highest kind of thinking.

7. This clause is usually translated thus: "and it is the most beneficial of all things for all those who are and will be capable of [such] participation"; but P. Shorey, "On *Philebus* 11B, C" (*Classical Philology* 3 [1908], 343) pointed out that the Greek does not bear this interpretation.

8. This pun on "to have given up" or "to have grown tired" (*apeirēkenai*) and "the unlimited" (*apeiron*) is echoed at the end of the dialogue (67B) with *apereis* ("you will not give up"). If one were to go back to the meaning of the verb *eipien* (to speak), *apeipein* in this sense would mean "to talk oneself out."

pleasure rather, both of us are defeated by the life that has these things securely,⁹ and the life of pleasure has the upper hand over that of thought—? 12A

PROTARCHUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Still, if it's akin to thought, thought wins out over pleasure, and she is defeated. Do you all say that this is the agreement, or how?

PROTARCHUS: It's my opinion at least.

SOCRATES: What about Philebus? What do you say?

PHILEBUS: As for me, it's my opinion and it shall be my opinion that pleasure wins no matter what; but you, Protarchus, you'll come to a decision on your own.

PROTARCHUS: Once you handed the speech over to us, Philebus, you would no longer have any authority over my agreement with Socrates, or maybe the contrary.

PHILEBUS: What you say is true. As a matter of fact, I wash my hands of it entirely and call to witness now the goddess herself.¹⁰ B

PROTARCHUS: And we would be joint witnesses with you to this very fact, that you were saying what you are saying. But more to the point, Socrates, the next thing in order, let us have a go at going to its limit regardless,¹¹ with Philebus if he's willing or however he wills.

SOCRATES: We must make a go of it, starting of course from the goddess herself. He claims that, although she is spoken of as Aphrodite, her truest name is Pleasure.

PROTARCHUS: Most right.

SOCRATES: My own dread, Protarchus, in the face of the names of the gods is never on a human level but lies beyond the greatest fear. So now in the case of Aphrodite, in whatever way it's dear to her, that's the way I address her; but as for pleasure I know it's a complex thing, and in beginning from it, just as I said, we must examine and reflect on what nature it has. Pleasure, to the extent that C

9. The plural demonstrative can refer either to the state (*hexis*) and disposition (*diathesis*) of soul capable of making human life happy or to pleasure and thought; if it refers to the latter, it anticipates Protarchus's later choice.

10. *Aphosioumai*, which is translated "I wash my hands of it entirely," has two senses; the literal one is "to make atonement" or "to cleanse oneself of a pollution," but it comes to mean "to do something for form's sake or perfunctorily," which is also the ordinary meaning of the phrase *hosiou heneka*, lit., "for the sake of the holy." The double sense of *aphosioumai* can be seen at *Phaedo* 60C.

11. "Have a go at going to its limit" is meant to suggest the pun in *peirōmetha perainein* ("Let's try to go through it to the end [limit]"); but it hardly suggests the implicit connection between experience (*empeiria*) and limit (*peras*).

it's spoken of just like that without qualification, is some one thing, but it surely has taken all sorts of shapes that are in some sense unlike one another. Look: We say the intemperate human being takes pleasure, and the moderate takes pleasure too in his being moderate; and the senseless, in turn, who is full of thoughtless opinions and hopes, takes pleasure, and in turn the thoughtful [takes pleasure] in his being thoughtful. And just how, for each pair of these pleasures, would one, in saying they are like one another, not justly come to light as mindless?

PROTARCHUS: The reason is, Socrates, that these pleasures are from contrary circumstances (*pragmata*); in themselves, however, they are not contrary to one another. How could pleasure not be most like to pleasure, this very thing to itself, it of all things (*khrēmata*)?

SOCRATES: How extraordinary you are! Color (*khroma*) too is like color. On this basis, color as a whole will not admit of any differences, although we all are acquainted with black and white, and know that black, besides being different from white, is in fact most contrary. Likewise, figure too is like figure; it is all one by genus, but as for its parts, some parts are most contrary to each other, and some surely admit of a thousandfold difference, and we'll find many other things to be in this way. So don't put any trust in this speech at least, that which makes all the most contrary things one. I'm afraid we'll find some pleasures contrary to pleasure.

PROTARCHUS: Perhaps; but why will this harm our speech?

SOCRATES: Because you address them, we'll say, although they are unlike, with another name, for you say that all the pleasant things are good. Now, no speech takes a stand in opposition to the fact that the pleasant things are pleasant; but although the majority of them are bad and there are good ones as well, as we assert, all the same you address them all as good, although, should one bring compulsion on you in the argument, you'll agree that they are unlike. What is it, then, that is the same in the bad and good pleasures alike so that you address all pleasures as being good?

PROTARCHUS: How do you mean, Socrates? Do you suppose anyone will concede the point, once he sets down the good to be pleasure, and will really put up with your saying that some pleasures are good and some other than them are bad?

SOCRATES: Well, at least, you'll say that they are unlike one another and some are contrary.

PROTARCHUS: Not at all, insofar as they are pleasures at any rate.

SOCRATES: We're being carried back to the same argument, Protarchus, and we'll assert that pleasure after all is not different from

pleasure, but all are alike, and the examples just now mentioned don't wound us at all, and we'll suffer and say just what the shallowest of all say and are as impetuous as the young when it comes to speeches. D

PROTARCHUS: What kind of things exactly do you mean?

SOCRATES: Because I, in imitating you and defending myself, if I have the nerve to say, "The most unlike of all things is most like to the most unlike," I'll be able to say the same as you did, and we'll both come to light as more impetuously youthful than we ought to be, and our argument will be thrown overboard and lost.¹² Let us, then, run the argument astern, and perhaps, if we should put the same hold on one another, perhaps we would somehow make a mutual concession.

PROTARCHUS: Say how. E

SOCRATES: Assume I'm being questioned again by you, Protarchus.

PROTARCHUS: What kind of question?

SOCRATES: When I am asked, "What in the world is good?" won't thought, knowledge,¹³ mind, and precisely all I set down at the beginning and said were good experience that same thing your argument did?

PROTARCHUS: How?

SOCRATES: All the sciences together will be thought to be many and some of them unlike one another; and if in fact some prove to be at some point or other contrary, would I actually deserve to be conversing now, if in fear of this very point I should declare that not one science is unlike science, and then our argument in this way, just as if it were a myth, would perish and be gone,¹⁴ but we ourselves would be brought to safety on some raft of irrationality? 14A

PROTARCHUS: Well, this ought not to happen, except the point about

12. "Will be thrown overboard and lost" forms in Greek the second half of a tragic trimeter and might be a quotation. There is an elaborate comparison of an argument to a raft by Simmias in the *Phaedo* 85D.

13. *Epistēmē* (knowledge) is also translated as "science"; it usually implies a higher degree of precision than "art" (*tekhnē*). That these terms are difficult to fix in Plato is shown by their distribution in the twin dialogues *Sophist* and *Statesman*. In the *Sophist*, "art" occurs sixty-two times and "knowledge" fourteen; but, in the *Statesman*, "art" occurs ninety-four times and "knowledge" fifty-nine.

14. The proverb "The myth is lost and gone" has three different explanations in the scholia on Plato. Here, it is said that it was applied to those who were not paying attention to what is being said; at *Theaetetus* 164D, it is said to be applicable to those who do not bring their account to a limit (*peras*); and, at the end of the *Republic* (621B), Proclus has the explanation for Socrates' "The myth was saved" that "The myth is lost and gone" refers to the fact that myths are as unuttered as what they speak of does not exist.

being brought to safety. However, the equality of your argument and mine appeases me:¹⁵ let there be many unlike pleasures and many different sciences.

- B SOCRATES: Well, then, Protarchus, without concealing the difference between mine and yours, let's set them out in the middle, and let's be daring and see whether they, in being tested in some way, might reveal whether one ought to say that the good is pleasure or thought or, third, something else. For surely we're not aiming at this kind of victory, that what I propose will be the winner or what you do, but we both must surely join in an alliance with the most truthful.

PROTARCHUS: Indeed we must.

- C SOCRATES: Well, then, let's confirm this argument still more through an agreement.

PROTARCHUS: What argument exactly?

SOCRATES: The one that causes trouble to all human beings, whether they be willing or some at times be unwilling.

PROTARCHUS: Speak more clearly.

SOCRATES: I mean the argument, amazing and somehow or other wonderful by nature, that just now came up incidentally. That the many are one and the one many is an amazing utterance, and it's easy to take a stand on either side against anyone who posits either one of them.

- D PROTARCHUS: Do you actually mean this? Whenever someone says of me Protarchus, who has come to be one by nature, that the me's again are many and contrary to one another, setting down the same [me] as tall and short, heavy and light, and thousands of others?¹⁶

SOCRATES: Well, Protarchus, you have spoken of the popular wonders about the one and many, but virtually everyone, in supposing that they're childish, easy, and strictly impediments to the arguments, has conceded by now that one ought not to fasten on things like that, since not even the following kinds of things ought to be handled, whenever someone divides up in speech the limbs and different parts of each thing, and once he has won the agreement

E

15. "Appeases" is *areskei*, which can also be translated "pleases" or "satisfies."

16. Compare *Parmenides*, 129C–D, where, in formulating for the first time his "theory of ideas," the young Socrates says: "But if someone will show that I am one and many, what's marvelous about that, saying, when he wants to prove I'm many, that my right side is one thing and my left side another, my front is one thing and my back another, and likewise with up and down—for I believe I partake of a manifold—and when he wants to prove I'm one, he will say that when we are seven I am one human being partaking as well of the one; hence he proves that both are true?"

from someone that that one is all those things, mockingly refutes him because he has been utterly compelled to assert monstrous things, "The one is many and unlimited," and, "The many are only one."¹⁷

PROTARCHUS: But you, Socrates, what kind of other things do you mean, which have not yet been publicized and conceded about this same argument?

SOCRATES: Whenever, my boy, someone sets down—not the one as we just now spoke of it, which is of the things that become and perish; for in that case, it has been conceded, as we said just now, that the one of this kind is not to be refuted—but whenever someone tries to set down human being as one and ox as one and the beautiful as one and the good as one, it's in the case of these henads and those like them that the extensive zeal displayed in their case, if it goes along with division, becomes a matter of dispute.¹⁸ 15A

PROTARCHUS: How?

SOCRATES: In the first place, whether one must suppose there truly are some monads of this kind; next, how these [monads], in turn, although each one is always the same and admits neither generation nor corruption, all the same [each] is most securely this one [monad];¹⁹ and after this, whether, in turn, among the things that B

17. Compare *Sophist* 251A–B: "In speaking of a human being, we surely name him many things besides, applying to him colors, figures, sizes, vices, and virtues, in all of which and thousands of others we say not only that he is a human being, but also good and infinitely other things. And with everything else besides in just this way, in accordance with the same speech, we lay down each as one, and then again we go on to speak of it as many and with many names. . . . It's from this vantage point, I suspect, that we've arranged a feast for the young and the late learners among the old, for it's straight off ready-at-hand for everyone to get a counterhold—'It's just as impossible for the many to be one as the one many.' And there's no doubt that they take pleasure in not allowing the speaking of a human being as good, for the good is good and the human being a human being."

18. The text has been much debated, either with the deletion of several words so that the sentence is made to read, "There is an overwhelming amount of dispute with regard to these henads etc.," or with an alteration of "zeal" (*spoudē*) so that it becomes an adverb. According to H. Cherniss (*The Riddle of the Early Academy* [Berkeley, Calif., 1945], 39–42), the difficulty alluded to is the problem of preserving the unity of an idea as a genus in light of its species, and he suggests that Speusippus based his abandonment of the ideas in favor of numbers on it (cf. also Cherniss's *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy* [Baltimore, 1944], 54–60). But the true difficulty arises from the split between the monads that the philosophical mathematicians insist on and the monads that Socrates is proposing (cf. 56D–E). Nowhere else in Plato are the ideas called either "henads" or "monads" (cf. *Phaedo* 101C, 105C).

19. The text and interpretation have been much disputed. The commentary (sec. XIV) gives a possible interpretation if the text is allowed to stand, but it has often been

come to be and [are] unlimited, one must set down [a monad] as pulled apart and become many, or as a whole apart from itself—it is this that would appear to be the most impossible of all things—it comes to be one and the same simultaneously in one and many.

C It is these points about the one and many of this kind, Protarchus, and not those, that are the cause of every kind of perplexity and pathlessness if they are not beautifully agreed on, and, in turn, causes of a good journey and a path without obstacles if they are beautifully agreed on.

PROTARCHUS: Must we not first, then, work our way through it, Socrates, at the present time?

SOCRATES: As I would claim at least.

PROTARCHUS: Well, then, suppose all of us here to concede to you on such a point; but perhaps it's best at the moment not to stir up Philebus by asking him, since he is well laid to rest as he is.²⁰

D SOCRATES: Very well. From what point is one to begin this extensive and omnifarious battle about the points in dispute? Is it from here?

PROTARCHUS: From where?

SOCRATES: We surely assert that the same thing, in becoming one and many by speeches, runs around on every side on the occasion of whatever is said, no less in the past than now. And this will never stop, and it did not start up now, but this kind of thing is, as it appears to me, a deathless and ageless experience of speeches themselves in us;²¹ and on each occasion when one of the young first gets a taste of it, he takes pleasure in it as if he had found some treasure trove of wisdom, and pleasure puts a god in him,²² and he gladly leaves no argument unturned, sometimes rolling it to one side and

E

rewritten to reduce the apparently three problems to two. G. E. Moore suggested that the second problem alludes to the good as the intelligible cosmos of all the ideas (Moore is cited on p. 215 of Bury's edition of the *Philebus*).

20. The proverb Protarchus alludes to is "Don't disturb the evil that is well laid to rest," which is applied to those who awaken evils against themselves. There is another proverb that might be lurking here: "Don't move the unmovable," which refers to sacred things that are not to be tampered with and in the context might refer to Philebus's unshakable conviction about pleasure.

21. "Deathless and ageless" is a Homeric phrase, which Calypso used to describe what she promised to make Odysseus (*Odyssey* 5.136); but it is also used of the gold and silver dogs in Alcinous's palace (*Odyssey* 7.94); and it occurs in Plato's *Statesman* (273E), describing the activity of the demiurge in his periodic renewal of the cosmos.

22. "Puts a god in" (*enthousiai*) is literally "to be in a state [usually morbid] of having the god within"; the corresponding adjective is *entheos* (with the god within); but both verb and adjective can mean no more than the word "enthusiasm" conveys in English.

kneading it into one, and then at other times unrolling it once more and dividing it up into parts, primarily throwing himself more than anyone else into perplexity, and secondarily whoever is next to him, regardless of whether he's younger, older, or a contemporary, sparing neither his father nor his mother, nor anyone else of his listeners, and almost no other animals—not just human beings, since he wouldn't spare any one of the barbarians, provided only that he had an interpreter from somewhere or other. 16A

PROTARCHUS: Do you actually see our number, Socrates? We are all young, and you're still not afraid, if you berate us, that we'll join with Philebus in an attack on you? Still and all we understand what you're saying, and if there is any way and device, on the one hand, for a disturbance of this kind to depart from our argument in some gracious manner or other, and, on the other, to find some more beautiful way than this for the argument, show your eagerness, and we shall follow along as best we can, for the present argument is not small, Socrates. B

SOCRATES: Indeed, it is not, my boys, as Philebus says when he addresses you. There is not, however, nor would there ever be, a more beautiful way than the one of which I am always a lover, although it has often before now escaped me and left me deserted, pathless, and perplexed.

PROTARCHUS: What is it? Let it only be said.

SOCRATES: Although it is scarcely difficult to make clear, it is very hard to use. Everything connected with and dependent on art was always discovered through it and has become manifest. Consider the way I mean. C

PROTARCHUS: Just speak.

SOCRATES: Well, it's a gift of the gods to human beings, as it appears to me; it was thrown by the gods from somewhere or other along with some most brilliant fire through some Prometheus; and the ancients, being superior to us and dwelling nearer to the gods, passed it on as a report, "Whatever are the things that are said to be, they are out of one and many, and they have in themselves an innate limit and unlimitedness." It intimates, then, that we must, since these things have been arranged in this kind of order, always set down on each occasion a single look (*idea*)²³ about anything and D

23. *Idea* is translated throughout as "look" (with one exception as noted), in order to distinguish it from *eidos*, which is always "species." While the range of their respective meanings is pretty nearly the same, *idea* seems to be more sensuous and to retain the root from the verb "to see" (*id*) more than *eidos*, although it too is ultimately from the same root.

go on to search for it—and since it is in it, we'll find it they say—and then if we get it, we must examine two after one [*idea*], whether they are in some way or other, and if not, three or some different number, and once more, likewise, [we must examine] each of those ones, until one sees how many the original one also is, and not just that it is one and many and unlimited; and we must not apply the look (*idea*) of the unlimited to the manifold before one catches sight of its entire number between the unlimited and the one, and then at that time dismiss (*khairein*) them all and let each and every one of them go to the unlimited.²⁴ Now the gods passed it on to us, as I said, that it was in this way that we were to examine and learn and teach one another; but human beings nowadays—those who are wise—make one and many haphazardly and any which way, faster and shorter²⁵ than they ought to, and immediately after the one they make things unlimited, but the middle things escape them. It is by the middle things that the separation has been made between our talking with one another dialectically and eristically.

PROTARCHUS: I have the impression, Socrates, that in some respects I do understand you in a sense, but in others I need to hear still more plainly what you're saying.

SOCRATES: What I'm saying, Protarchus, is really plain in the case of letters, and take it in just the way you have been educated in them.

PROTARCHUS: How?

SOCRATES: Although there is no doubt that our voice, the voice of each and every one of us, which proceeds through the mouth, is one and, in turn, unlimited in multitude—

PROTARCHUS: Why of course.

SOCRATES: Still, we are not yet wise at all merely by either one of these, either because we know the unlimited of it, or because we know the one of it; but what makes each one of us skilled in grammar is this, that we know how many they [the sounds] are and what kind they are.²⁶

24. One might compare the revised account of the Heracliteans and Empedocleans that the Eleatic Stranger gives in the *Sophist* (252b1–6): “And, further, all those who at times put everything together and at times divide them, regardless of whether they divide and put together an infinity of things into one and divide out of one into an infinity, or they divide into elements with a limit and put things together out of them, and similarly whether they set this down as alternately becoming, and similarly whether they set it down as always becoming—in all these cases they would be saying nothing if there is no mixing together.”

25. “Shorter” (*brakhuteron*) is Badham’s emendation of the manuscripts’ “slower” (*braduteron*).

26. “Grammatic” is used throughout for *grammatikē*, the art of reading and writing. Letters are used in the *Theaetetus* (202E ff.) for the interpretation of the view that the

PROTARCHUS: Most true.

SOCRATES: And it is the same thing, moreover, that in fact makes each of us musical.²⁷

PROTARCHUS: How?

SOCRATES: While according to that art, no doubt, sound too is one in it— C

PROTARCHUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: Are we to set down two as low and high,²⁸ and a third with a uniform pitch? Or how?

PROTARCHUS: In this way.

SOCRATES: But should you know just them alone, you would not yet be wise in music, but if you do not know them, you will be virtually worthless in this regard.

PROTARCHUS: Yes, worthless.

SOCRATES: But, my dear, whenever you grasp how many numerable intervals there are in respect to the highness and lowness of the sound, and what kinds they are, and the boundaries of the intervals, and how many scales (*sustēmata*) have come to be out of them—those who preceded us observed them, and they passed on the traditional name “adjustments” (*harmoniai*) to us their followers—and they observed, in turn, that there are other affects (*pathē*) of the same kind coming to be in the motions of the body (it is these, they say, once they are measured through numbers, that must be given the name of rhythms and meters [measures]), and they passed on the insight at the same time that it is in this way that one must make one’s observations about every one and many—and just as, whenever you grasp the intervals and scales of music in this way, then you become wise, so too, whenever, in making observations of this kind, you seize anything else whatsoever of the ones, then in this way you have become thoughtfully informed (*emphrōn*) about it; but the multitude of each several thing and in each several thing, as long as on each and every occasion it is endless (*apeiron*), sets no end (*apeiron*) to your own thoughtlessness, and it makes you as D E

elements of knowledge are unknowable but their combinations or syllables are knowable and in the *Sophist* (253A) for setting up a parallel science of five genera: Being, Motion, Rest, Same, Other.

27. Compare *Sophist* 253B: “Isn’t the musician the one who has the art to recognize the kinds [of high and low notes] that mix and don’t mix together, and the one who does not understand is unmusical?” At 253A, there is a more elaborate analysis of letters on the same lines.

28. “Low and high” (*baru kai oxu*) are also used of the grave and acute accents on vowels (cf. *Cratylus* 399B).

inconsequent as inconsequential and as incapable of counting as of being of any account, because you never looked away from everything else toward any number in anything.²⁹

PROTARCHUS: It appears to me at least, Philebus, that Socrates has spoken the present remarks most beautifully.

18A PHILEBUS: To me too, if they're taken by themselves; but why exactly has this speech been spoken before us now, and what in the world does it mean [want]?

SOCRATES: The question Philebus has asked us, Protarchus, is right on the mark.

PROTARCHUS: Yes, of course, and just answer him.

SOCRATES: I'll do it once I go through a small point about these very things. Just as if someone were ever to grasp any one whatsoever, he, as we assert, must not look straightaway at the nature of the unlimited but at some number, so too in the contrary case, whenever someone is compelled to take the unlimited first, he must not look straightaway at the one, but he must conceive of each with some number in its manifold, and end from all to one. As for what is now being said, let's take it up once more in the case of letters.

B

PROTARCHUS: How?

SOCRATES: After someone—either some god or maybe a divine human being (the story goes that it was a certain Theuth in Egypt)³⁰—conceived of sound as unlimited, he was the first to realize that the vowels in the unlimited were not one but several, and again others,

29. There is a series of puns in this passage that cannot be reproduced exactly. The multitude is called "unlimited" (*apeiron*) in such a way that it stands in the sentence next to "you," which, although it does not syntactically modify it, prepares the way for *apeiron* in the sense of "inexperienced," which does qualify "you." I have tried to convey this by translating *apeiron* by "endless" and "inexperienced (*apeiros*) in thoughtfulness" by "no end to thoughtlessness." Socrates then takes the word *ellogimos* (notable) as if it were to be literally understood as "he who has *logos* in him" and *enarithmos* as if it were "he who has number (*arithmos*) in him" rather than as "he who is to be reckoned with." "As inconsequent as inconsequential" is meant to convey the double meaning of *ellogimos* and "as incapable of counting as of being of any account" that of *enarithmos*. There is a similar series of puns in *Timaeus* 55c7–8 with regard to whether there is a finite but not an infinite number of universes.

30. At *Phaedrus* 274C–275B, Socrates gives an account of what ensued after Theuth's discovery of letters, but there Theuth is said to be a god. The *Philebus* passage is one of the very few in antiquity in which it is acknowledged that Egyptian writing was phonetic; elsewhere it is treated as if it were entirely ideographic. It should be remarked, however, that Egyptian writing does not represent the vowels. "Divine human being" (*theios anthrōpos*) is a rare expression in Greek; it recurs twice elsewhere in Plato (*Minos* 318e9; *Leges* 951b5; cf. *Epinomis* 992c6).

although they were not partaking of sound, still they shared in a kind of noise (*phthoggos*), and there was a certain number of these too,³¹ and he set apart a third species of letters, the ones we now call consonants (*aphōna*); but after this he proceeded to divide the noiseless and voiceless up to each one, and the voiced and the middle ones in the same manner, until he took the number of them and, to each one individually and to all of them together, gave the name element (*stoikheion*); but on noticing that not one of us would ever understand even one alone by itself without all of them, he calculated that the element was the bond, and on the grounds that it was one and in some sense was making all of them one, he noised it abroad that it was the grammatic art and addressed it as being one over their range.³²

PHILEBUS: I understand this, Protarchus, still more plainly than that, merely if they're compared with one another; but the same point of my speech is still missing no less now than a little while ago.

SOCRATES: Isn't it, Philebus, "What's all this got to do with that?"

PHILEBUS: Yes, that's what Protarchus and I have been seeking for some time now.

SOCRATES: Well, actually, you are already at it, and yet you've been seeking it for some time, as you say.

PHILEBUS: How?

SOCRATES: Wasn't our argument actually from the beginning about thought and pleasure, which of the pair is to be chosen?

PHILEBUS: Of course it was.

SOCRATES: And we further say each of the pair is one?

PHILEBUS: Yes, of course.

SOCRATES: Well, then, the prior argument is demanding from us this very point, how is each of them one and many, and how are they not straight off unlimited, but how each of them possesses some number at some time prior to its having become unlimited.

PROTARCHUS: I don't know how he did it, Philebus, but somehow

31. Compare *Theaetetus* 203B: "The sigma belongs to the voiceless (*aphōna*); it's only a sound (*psophos*); it's like when the tongue hisses; and of the beta in turn and most of the elements as well there's neither voice (*phōnē*) nor sound (*psophos*).³¹ There are seven vowels in the Greek alphabet (α, ε, η, ι, ο, υ, ω), eight semivowels (ζ, λ, μ, ν, ξ, ρ, σ, ψ), and nine consonants (β, γ, δ, θ, κ, π, τ, φ, χ).

32. "Noised it abroad" (*epephthegxato*, "he pronounced") is meant to bring out the allusion to *phthoggos* (noise) above. Compare *Cratylus* 424C: "Mun't we too in this way divide the vowels (*ta phōneenta*) first, and then of the rest kind by kind, the voiceless (*aphōna*) and soundless (*aphthogga*)—this is what the clever in these matters call them—and in turn those that are not vowels (*phōneenta*) but still are not soundless (*aphthogga*)?"

or other Socrates led us around in a circle and has cast us into a not shallow and trivial question. And do consider which one of us will answer the present question. So maybe it's ridiculous that I, who undertook to replace you completely as the successor in the argument, on account of my incapacity to answer the present question, enjoin it once more on you; but it's far more ridiculous, I suspect, if neither of us is capable. Do consider. What are we to do? Socrates, it seems to me, is asking us now about the species of pleasure, whether they are or are not, how many they are, and what kinds they are. And in turn about thought likewise on the same terms.

B SOCRATES: What you say is most true, son of Callias.³³ As the past argument revealed, if we are not able to do this in the case of every one, like, and same, and their contraries, not any one of us would ever prove to be worth anything in anything.

C PROTARCHUS: That seems to be pretty nearly the case, Socrates. But although it's a beautiful thing for the moderate to know everything, still it's thought to be a second sailing not to be unaware of oneself.³⁴ Why exactly have I said this now? I shall make it plain to you. It was you, Socrates, who freely offered to all of us this get-together and yourself for the purpose of articulating and interpreting what is the best of human possessions. Philebus said it was pleasure, delight, joy,³⁵ and everything of the kind; you spoke against them and said it wasn't these but those we often remind ourselves of willingly (and it's right to do so), in order that in being stored in the memory each may be tested. You assert, it seems, that what will rightly be addressed as a good better than pleasure at least is mind, knowledge, intelligence, art, and in turn everything akin to them; and you assert one ought to acquire them and not the others. When each position was stated disputatiously, we threatened you playfully, "We shall not let you go home before some

33. Callias is too common a name to determine who Protarchus's father was, and, on the basis of what we know, it is impossible that the Callias who is meant is the one at whose house the sophists gathered in the *Protagoras*.

34. "A second sailing" means to rely on one's own power and not do what otherwise would be best under favorable conditions; it refers to rowing rather than to any reliance on the winds. The phrase occurs twice elsewhere in Plato, once in the *Phaedo* (99C), where Socrates speaks of his turn away from a teleological physics to the "ideas," and also in the *Statesman* (300C), where it refers to the use of laws instead of reliance on the wisdom of the wise man on the spot.

35. *Khara* (joy) does not appear anywhere else in Plato; it is to be found mostly in tragedy and comedy.

satisfactory limit³⁶ to the determination of these arguments has been reached." You agreed and gave yourself to us for this purpose, and we're saying, just like children, "There's no possibility of taking back what's been rightly given." So in light of what's now being said, stop confronting us in this way of yours. E

SOCRATES: What way do you mean?

PROTARCHUS: By casting us into perplexity where there's no way out and asking us questions to which we would not be able to offer you at the moment a satisfactory and adequate answer. Let us not suspect that the perplexity of all of us is the end for us of the present issue, but if we are unable to do it, you must do it; you promised. So in light of this, go ahead and deliberate on your own whether you must divide the species of pleasure and knowledge or maybe let them go, if in some sense along some other turn you are able and want to make clear in some different way the dispute we now have. 20A

SOCRATES: Well, then, since you spoke this way, poor little me must no longer expect anything dreadful, for the phrase "if you want," once it's uttered, dissolves every fear about each point. And besides, one of the gods I think has granted us a kind of memory. B

PROTARCHUS: How exactly and of what?

SOCRATES: I once heard some time ago some speeches, in a dream or maybe when I was awake, about pleasure and thought, and I now have them in mind. They said that neither of the pair is the good, but there's something else, a third, other than them but better than both. And if this, with all the vividness of daylight, comes to sight for us now, then pleasure has been discharged from winning, for the good would prove to be no longer the same as it. Or how? C

PROTARCHUS: Just so.

SOCRATES: And in my opinion we shall no longer have any further need of the issues involved in the division of species of pleasure; but as it goes forward the argument will show it still more plainly.

PROTARCHUS: As you put it most beautifully, go on to the end [limit] in just this way.

SOCRATES: Well, then, let's make beforehand a still further agreement on some small points.

PROTARCHUS: What kind?

36. "*Peras hikanon* [satisfactory limit]: This nontechnical use of these significant terms by Protarchus seems premeditated" (Bury ad loc.). Socrates uses the phrase at 30C.

- D SOCRATES: Whether it's a necessity that the lot and portion of the good be complete and perfect or not complete and perfect.
 PROTARCHUS: Surely, Socrates, the most complete and perfect of all.
 SOCRATES: What of this? Is the good adequate and sufficient?
 PROTARCHUS: Of course, and it differs in this respect from all the things that are.
 SOCRATES: And it's most necessary, moreover, to make this further point about it, I suspect: everything that knows it pursues and desires it, and wants to take it and acquire and keep it about itself, and does not give a thought to anything else—except to the things that are completed along with goods.
 PROTARCHUS: It's impossible to contradict this.
- E SOCRATES: So let's examine and judge the life of pleasure and the life of thought by looking at them separately.
 PROTARCHUS: How do you mean it?
 SOCRATES: Let there be neither thought in the life of pleasure nor pleasure in the life of thought, for if either of them is good,³⁷ it must not have any additional need of anything; but if either comes
 21A to light as needy, this is surely no longer the really and truly³⁸ good for us.³⁹
 PROTARCHUS: How could it be?
 SOCRATES: In testing them let's try it out in you.
 PROTARCHUS: Yes, let's.
 SOCRATES: So answer.
 PROTARCHUS: Speak.
 SOCRATES: Would you, Protarchus, choose to live your whole life taking pleasure in the greatest pleasures?
 PROTARCHUS: Why not?
 SOCRATES: Would you actually believe, then, if you have that perfectly and completely, you still had need of something in addition?
 PROTARCHUS: Not at all.
 SOCRATES: Do look: to be thoughtful, to think, to calculate what was

37. One manuscript reads "if either of them is the good."

38. Throughout, "really and truly" translates the single Greek word *ontōs*, which is the adverbial form of the neuter participle of the verb "to be." It is thus to be distinguished from whatever particle might at times be translated by "really" alone as well as from the adverb *alēthōs*, which is translated throughout as "truly."

39. Compare Aristotle (*Nicomachean Ethics* (EN) 1172b28–34: "By this kind of argument Plato proves that the good is not pleasure, for the pleasant life is preferable with thought (*phronēsis*) than apart, and if the mixed is better, pleasure is not the good; and it is plain that nothing else either, which proves to be preferable if it is with one of the things that is good in itself, would be the good."

needed, and everything related to them—you wouldn't have any need of them, would you? B

PROTARCHUS: Why would I? Surely I would have everything should I have enjoyment.

SOCRATES: Then should you live in this way, although you would always be enjoying the greatest pleasures throughout your life—?

PROTARCHUS: Why not?

SOCRATES: Still, without the possession of mind, memory, knowledge, and true opinion, this very issue, whether you're enjoying or not enjoying, surely it's a necessity for you, in the first place, not to know, being empty as you would be of every kind of thought.

PROTARCHUS: It's a necessity.

SOCRATES: And further in the same way, if you do not possess memory, it surely is a necessity that you do not remember either what you once were enjoying, and when the pleasure of the moment occurs incidentally, no memory of it whatsoever lingers; and, in turn, if you don't possess true opinion, you won't opine that you're enjoying although you are enjoying, and, on being deprived of calculation, you are incapable of calculating for later time that you will enjoy, and you are not living the life of a human being but of some jellyfish or any one of those that live in the sea and are ensouled with testaceous bodies. Is this the case, or can we conceive of different things beyond them? C D

PROTARCHUS: How could we?

SOCRATES: Is a life like that actually choosable by us?

PROTARCHUS: This speech, Socrates, has now cast me absolutely into speechlessness.

SOCRATES: Well, then, let's not yet become soft and cowardly, but let's take up in turn the life of mind and look at it.

PROTARCHUS: What kind of life do you mean?

SOCRATES: Whether one of us would choose, in turn, to live in possession of thought, mind, knowledge, and an entire memory of everything, but without any share in pleasure, either great or small, any more than in pain,⁴⁰ but altogether unaffected by all things of the kind.⁴¹ E

40. This is the first occurrence of the word "pain" (*lupe*); altogether, it occurs sixty-seven times and the corresponding verb *lupein/lupeisthai* (to pain/to be pained) twenty-one times.

41. Compare Aristotle *EN* 1174a1–8: "Just as no one would choose to live with the thought of a child throughout his life, taking pleasure in the things that children most enjoy, any more than anyone would choose to enjoy doing any of the most shameful things, so we would be devoted to many things even if they should confer no pleasure,

PROTARCHUS: Neither of them, Socrates, is for me at least a life to be chosen, and, I suspect, it will never appear so to anyone else.

22A SOCRATES: What about the life of both together, Protarchus? Mixed together from both and a partner in both?

PROTARCHUS: You mean of pleasure and mind and thought?

SOCRATES: Yes, I mean that and things of the kind.

PROTARCHUS: Surely everyone will choose this life prior to either of those, and besides, it's not that one will choose it and another not, but everyone will without exception.

SOCRATES: Do we then understand what the consequence is for us now in the present argument?

B PROTARCHUS: Yes, of course. It's that three lives were proposed, and neither of the pair of them is adequate, any more than they are choosable for any human being or animal.

SOCRATES: Then it's clear by now about them at least that neither of the pair had the good; otherwise it would be adequate, perfect, and choosable for all plants and animals, for whom it was possible to live always throughout their lives in this way; but were any one of us to choose different things, he would be taking them against his will and, out of ignorance or some unhappy necessity, contrary to the nature of the truly choosable.

PROTARCHUS: It looks at any rate as if this is so.

C SOCRATES: Well, then, that one ought not to conceive of the goddess of Philebus at least as the same as the good seems to me to have been said adequately—

PHILEBUS: Any more than your mind, Socrates, is the good either, but it will surely face the same charges.

SOCRATES: Yes, Philebus, perhaps mine. I suspect, however, that the true and genuine divine mind does not admit this charge, but it is in some different state. Now I'm not as yet disputing on behalf of mind for the victory prize over against the common life, but we have to see and consider what we'll do about the second prize. Perhaps each of us would claim responsibility for this common life, I that mind is the cause,⁴² and you that pleasure is, and should this be so, although neither of them would be the good, perhaps someone might suppose that one or the other was the cause. Now on this point I would fight Philebus to the finish still more and insist

D

for example, sight, memory, knowledge, and virtues; and it makes no difference if of necessity pleasures go along with them, for we would choose them even if pleasure should not arise from them."

42. The word "cause" (*aition*) has as its denominative *aitiaomai*, which has just been translated as "claim responsibility."

that, in the case of this mixed life, whatever that thing is, in the taking of which this life has become as choiceworthy as it is good, it is not pleasure but mind that is more akin to it and bears the greater likeness, and, according to this argument, it would never be truly said that pleasure partakes of either first or second prize, but it is farther off than third prize, if at the moment we have to put any trust at all in my mind.

E

PROTARCHUS: Well, Socrates, it's my opinion that as of now you're responsible for the utter collapse of pleasure, knocked down as it were by the present arguments, for she got laid out in fighting for the victory prize; but mind, it seems—one has to say it—thoughtfully refused to lay a claim to the victory prize, for if he had, he would have experienced the same. But pleasure, should she be deprived of second prize, would absolutely incur some dishonor from her lovers, for if that were the case, she would no longer appear as beautiful even to them.

23A

SOCRATES: What then? Isn't it better to let her go now and not, by the application to her of the most precise and refined torture, refute and pain her?

PROTARCHUS: You're talking nonsense, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Because I actually said the impossible, to pain pleasure?⁴³

B

PROTARCHUS: Not only that, but because you're also unaware that not one of us will release you yet before you come to the complete end of these things in the argument.

SOCRATES: Boy O Boy!⁴⁴ Protarchus. What a vast argument is left, and it's pretty nearly not even easy at the moment. In going for second prize on behalf of mind, it appears there's need of a different contrivance, and to have weapons (as it were) other than those of the previous arguments, but perhaps some are also the same. Should we then?

PROTARCHUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: Let's try to be cautious in setting down its beginning.

C

PROTARCHUS: What beginning exactly do you mean?

SOCRATES: Let's take apart in two all the beings now in the whole, but rather,⁴⁵ if you want, in three.

PROTARCHUS: Would you point out on what lines?

43. "Had Prot. already seen the joke when he said *ouden legeis* ['You're talking nonsense']? I think not; but S. is in a humorous bantering mood and points out his own joke" (Bury ad loc.).

44. "Boy O Boy" is *babai*, which expresses astonishment and surprise.

45. "Rather" is *mallon*, which also occurs later in Socrates' formula for the unlimited, "the more and less." *Mallon* is also translated as "rather" at 11E, 42A, 60E (twice), and 67B; it often expresses a preference.

SOCRATES: Let's pick up some points of the present arguments.

PROTARCHUS: Which?

SOCRATES: We were saying doubtless that the god showed the unlimited of the beings, and the limit.

PROTARCHUS: Yes, of course.

D SOCRATES: Let's set down these two as a pair of species and the third as a one being mixed together out of both. I am, as it seems, a ridiculous human being, setting things apart by species and numbering them together.

PROTARCHUS: Why do you say that, my good man?

SOCRATES: It appears to me there's further need of a fourth genus.

PROTARCHUS: Say what it is.

SOCRATES: Look at the cause of the mixing together of these things relative to one another, and, in addition to those three, please set it down for me as the fourth.

PROTARCHUS: Won't you, then, have further need of some fifth as well with the power to discriminate?

E SOCRATES: Perhaps, but not, I suspect, at the moment. If, however, the need does arise, you'll surely forgive me if I go after a fifth?⁴⁶

PROTARCHUS: Why of course.

SOCRATES: First, then, after a division of three from four, let's try in the case of two of them, once we see that each of the two has suffered a split and splintering into many, by a bringing together once more of each of the two into one, let's try to conceive in what way each of them was one and many.

PROTARCHUS: I would follow perhaps, should you tell me about them still more plainly.

24A SOCRATES: Well, then, I'm saying that the two I'm proposing are the same as I did just now, the unlimited and that with limit; and I'll try to point out that in a certain way the unlimited is many. But that which has limit, let it wait around for us to catch up.⁴⁷

PROTARCHUS: It's waiting.

SOCRATES: Consider then. Although what I'm urging you to consider is difficult and disputable, still and all do consider it. First off, in the case of hotter and colder, see whether you could ever conceive of some limit, or would the more and less,⁴⁸ which dwell as a

46. The manuscripts read "after a fifth life," "life" is either deleted or emended to "perforce" (*biai*).

47. Badham clearly saw that "that which has limit," which is translated above as "that with limit," must refer to the mix, so he bracketed both.

48. The phrase "more and less" (*mallon te kai hēttōn*) occurs seven times in the *Philebus* (once without the article, 24E) and nowhere else in Plato, but the variant *mallon kai*

pair in them, as long as the pair is dwelling within, disallow to the genera an end and completion to come to be, for when an ending occurs, the pair of them also has come to an end.

B

PROTARCHUS: What you say is most true.

SOCRATES: And always, we say, the more and less are in the hotter and colder.

PROTARCHUS: Indeed.

SOCRATES: Well, then, the speech points out to us always this pair does not have an end and completion;⁴⁹ but being as a pair endless and without completion it becomes absolutely unlimited.

PROTARCHUS: Yes, exactly,⁵⁰ Socrates.

SOCRATES: Well, that is a good point, my dear Protarchus; you picked it up well and recalled that this "exactly" [extremely], which you just now uttered, and "slightly" too have the same power [significance] as the more and less; for wherever the pair of them is, it refuses to allow each of them to be a so much, but by always implanting more extreme than more slight and the contrary in each of several actions, the pair produces the more and the less and makes the so much vanish. For, as was now stated, if the pair does not make the so much vanish but allows it and the measured to come to be in the seat of the more and less and the extreme and slight, these things would depart on their

C

D

hēiton (i.e., without the supplementary connective *te*, which in general has the effect of making two items into a couple) occurs at 24D as well as at *Protagoras* 356A and *Timaeus* 87A (it is also very common in Aristotle). For the inverse *hēiton kai mallon*, see 52C. According to Porphyry's report on Plato's mysterious lecture "On the Good," "the more and less" was tentatively identified with the "indeterminate dyad"—which was also called "the big and small" or "the unlimited." Along with "the one," the "indeterminate dyad" was the principle of all beings (cf. *Simplicius in libros Aristotelis Physicorum commentaria* 3.4, pp. 453,25–455,11 ed. H. Diels [Berlin, 1895]). In the *Physics* 192a6–25, Aristotle distinguishes between the three principles that he believes are indispensable for any physics—form (*eidōs*), matter, and privation—and the apparent three of the Platonists—*eidōs* and the big and small (cf. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato*, 84–92; cf. also *Physics* 203a1–16 and *Metaphysics* 987b20–26, where he contrasts the Pythagorean unlimited, which is one, with the Platonic unlimited, which is the dyad of the big and small). There was also a Platonic teaching that the one and the indeterminate dyad are the principles of number (cf. Aristotle *Metaphysics* 1081a14–1082b37, 1088a15–b13).

49. The grammatical irregularity is meant to convey the ambiguity of "always," whether it refers to the speech or the more and less.

50. *Sphodra* is translated throughout as either "exactly" or "extremely" in order to convey the range of its meaning and not confound it in a neutral "very much." The one exception is found at 14D, where it is translated "strictly." On the two occasions, moreover, where *sphodra* is a substantive, it is translated by "intensity" (45C, 45D).

own from their own place in which the pair was. Once the pair takes the so much, it would no longer be hotter or colder either, for the hotter is always advancing and does not wait, and the colder likewise; but the so much stops and ceases going on. So according to this argument the hotter together with its contrary would become unlimited.

E PROTARCHUS: It appears so at any rate, Socrates, but it is, as you say, not easy to follow; but perhaps if it were stated again and again it would plainly bring the questioner and the questioned to an adequate consonance.

SOCRATES: Well, that's a good point, and we must try to do it in that way. Now look and see whether we shall accept this as a sign of the nature of the unlimited, in order that, in explicating everything, we may not go on too long.

PROTARCHUS: What exactly do you mean?

25A SOCRATES: In conformity with the previous argument, if you remember—we were saying we had to bring together as best we could and stamp some single nature on everything splintered and split apart—we must put everything that comes to light for us as becoming more and less and receiving the extreme and slight, the too much, and everything else of this kind, into the genus of the unlimited as if into one.

PROTARCHUS: I remember.

B SOCRATES: Then the things that don't receive them but do receive everything contrary to them—in the first place, the equal and equality, and after the equal the double, and anything that is related as number to number or measure to measure—if we reckon them all together into the limit, we would be thought to be doing it beautifully. Or how do you say?

PROTARCHUS: Most beautifully, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Very well then; but the third, which is mixed from both of this pair, what look (*idea*) are we to say it has?

PROTARCHUS: You're going to point it out to me too, I suspect.

SOCRATES: No, not I, but a god rather, if, that is, one of the gods hearkens to my prayers.

PROTARCHUS: Do pray then and consider.

SOCRATES: I am considering. And it's my impression, Protarchus, that one of them has just now proved to be friendly to us.

C PROTARCHUS: What do you mean by this, and what kind of evidence do you use?

SOCRATES: Obviously, I'll point it out. But please follow me in the argument.

PROTARCHUS: Just speak.

SOCRATES: We were surely speaking just now of something as hotter and colder. Weren't we?

PROTARCHUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then add to them drier and wetter, greater and littler, quicker and slower, bigger and smaller, and everything in the previous argument we were putting into one as belonging to the nature that accepts the more and less.

PROTARCHUS: You mean the nature of the unlimited? D

SOCRATES: Yes. Then mix into it in turn that which comes after them, the offspring of the limit.

PROTARCHUS: What offspring?

SOCRATES: It's what we did not even now bring together, although we should have done it, and just as we brought together the offspring of the unlimited into one, so we should have also brought together the offspring of the limitlike into one. But perhaps it will be just as effective even now, if, when both of them are being brought together, that offspring too will become plain.⁵¹

PROTARCHUS: What kind do you mean, and how?

SOCRATES: The offspring of the equal and double, and as many offspring as put a stop to the things that are contrarily at odds with one another, and by the insertion of number render them commensurate and consonant.⁵² E

PROTARCHUS: I understand. It appears to me that you are saying that if you mix these things the result is certain becomings in each individual case.

SOCRATES: Yes, and it appears that I'm right.

51. This translates Burnet's text, but there are several difficulties. The first is whether *tauton drasei* can mean "it will be just as effective"; the second and more serious is whether the offspring of the limitlike can become evident if the uncollected limitlike and the unlimited are brought together. The commentary argues that the limitlike takes two forms, one by itself in the form of arithmetic and geometry, which cannot in turn be brought together, and another in the form of measures and the measure of the mean in the mix. It might be thought that "brought together" should be replaced by Jackson's "mixed together," but comparison of *Sophist* 251D with 253C shows that the two terms are not as distinct as one might wish.

52. "Commensurate" (*summetra*) means that that which is being measured matches that which is doing the measuring; from this sense it comes to mean "symmetrical" (the term recurs at 26A, 64D, 64E, 65A, 66B). "Measure" itself is *metron*, and it occurs in the sense of musical measures at 17D and in a sense close to that at 56A twice. "Measure" as scale and ruler is at 56B; its other occurrences are at 25B (twice), 26D, 43C, 52C, 66A. "Measured" (*metrion*), which literally means "that which has a measure" would not in itself imply "within measure" or "moderate"; it occurs at 24C, 32A, 43C, 52C, and 66A. "That in which there is measure" is *emmetron* (26A, 52C, 52D, 65D), and "what is without measure" (*ametron*) occurs at 52C and 65D. The verb "to measure" (*metreo*) is only at 17D.

PROTARCHUS: Well, then, speak.

SOCRATES: In the case of illness, doesn't the right partnership of these things actually generate the nature of health?

26A PROTARCHUS: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: While in the case of high and low notes, and fast and slow, which are unlimited, don't these same things, if they come to be simultaneously in them, actually produce a limit and put together most perfectly and completely all of music?⁵³

PROTARCHUS: Yes, most beautifully.

SOCRATES: And, further, in the case of winter cold and choking heat, if [the right partnership] comes to be in them, it takes away the much too much and unlimited and produces that in which there is measure and at the same time the commensurate.

PROTARCHUS: Why of course.

B SOCRATES: Then out of them, when the unlimited things and those that have limit are mixed together, the seasons and everything beautiful have come to be for us?

PROTARCHUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And I'm leaving out, of course, thousands of different things, beauty and strength, for example, if they're with health, and, in turn, many other perfectly beautiful things in souls. Surely, my beautiful Philebus, it is that goddess of yours⁵⁴ who catches sight of hubris and the totality of wickedness in everything and, in observing that there is no limit either of pleasures or of satiations in them, sets down in them the pair that does have a limit, law and order. Although you claim that she irritates and grates, I, on the contrary, speak of her as the preserver and savior. And you, Protarchus, how does it appear to you?

C

PROTARCHUS: Indeed, Socrates, it appears to me to be very much to my way of thinking.

SOCRATES: Now, as I have spoken of these three, if you understand—

PROTARCHUS: Well, I believe I understand. By one of them you seem to me to mean the unlimited, and by the second one the limit in the things that are; but as for the third, I don't get exactly what you want to point out.

53. After "unlimited," Burnet reads: "Aren't there actually these same things? Doesn't it [i.e., the right partnership] produce simultaneously a limit and put together most perfectly all of music?"

54. "That goddess of yours" overtranslates perhaps *hautē hē theos* (this goddess), but the demonstrative is associated with the second person and thus makes it Philebus's goddess, but in the sense either that she is Aphrodite or that it is the goddess that Philebus, as an advocate of pleasure, must be most concerned with—the goddess of law and order. The commentary argues that, in the context, they are the same.

SOCRATES: The reason is—you surprise me—that the multitude of the genesis of the third dismayed you; yet the unlimited too offered many genera, but all the same, once they had been stamped and sealed by the genus of the more and its contrary, they came to light as one. D

PROTARCHUS: True.

SOCRATES: And the limit too neither had many genera nor were we distressed that it was not one by nature.⁵⁵

PROTARCHUS: How could we?

SOCRATES: In no way. But when I set down their entire offspring as this one, say that what I mean by the third is this, the genesis into being (*ousia*) that has been produced along with the limit out of the measures.⁵⁶

PROTARCHUS: I understand.

SOCRATES: But more to the point, we were then saying that besides the three there was some fourth genus we had to examine. The examination is a joint one. Look and see whether you think it necessary that all the things that come into being come into being on account of some cause. E

PROTARCHUS: Yes I do, for how else could they come to be without it?

SOCRATES: Isn't it the case that the nature of the maker does not at all differ, except by name, from cause, and the maker and the cause would rightly be spoken of as one?⁵⁷

PROTARCHUS: Rightly.

SOCRATES: And further, we shall find, in turn, that, just as for cause and maker, what is being made and what becomes do not differ except by name.⁵⁸ Or how? 27A

PROTARCHUS: That's so.

SOCRATES: Doesn't the maker, then, always take the lead by nature, and what is being made follow behind it in becoming?

55. This passage is often emended to read as follows: "And we were not distressed that the limit too neither had many nor was one by nature." The emendation assumes that the limit has been unified in the same sense as the unlimited has been, but there are reasons for thinking that that is not the case.

56. This is the text of manuscript W. Both B and T read: "out of the measures that have been produced along with the limit."

57. The second time the words "cause" and "maker" are mentioned here, they are in the neuter (*to aition* and *to poioun*, respectively), whereas the first mention of "cause" is in the feminine (*aitia*). This strongly suggests that the first mention of "maker" is to be thought of as masculine.

58. The assimilation of "becoming" to a product of making is all the easier in Greek because "to become" (*gignesthai*) is often used as the passive of "to make" (*poiein*) (cf. *Hippias Maior* 297A).

PROTARCHUS: Sure.

SOCRATES: So cause and what is enslaved to cause for the purpose of genesis are different after all and not the same.

PROTARCHUS: Why of course.

SOCRATES: Whereas the things that come to be and out of which all things come to be supplied us with three genera—

PROTARCHUS: Yes, indeed.

B SOCRATES: We're counting the cause as fourth, the crafter of all these things, on the grounds that it has been made clear adequately enough that it's other than them.

PROTARCHUS: Yes, other.

SOCRATES: Now for the sake of remembering each one, it's right, once there is a distinct determination of the four, to enumerate them in order.

PROTARCHUS: Why of course.

C SOCRATES: Well, then, in the first place I mean the unlimited, and second limit, and then mixed out of them the third, a being (*ousia*) that has come to be; and should I speak of the cause of the mixture and genesis as the fourth, would I actually be striking any false note?

PROTARCHUS: But how?

SOCRATES: Then come, what's our next argument after this? And why in the world did we arrive at this point? What did we want? Wasn't this actually the point? We were seeking whether second prize would belong to pleasure or thought. Wasn't this the case?

PROTARCHUS: Yes, it was the case.

SOCRATES: Would it actually now be the case perhaps, after we made this articulation and division, that we would complete and perfect more beautifully the decision about first and second? It was about them that we took at first opposite stands.

PROTARCHUS: Perhaps.

D SOCRATES: Come then. As we surely set down the mixed life of pleasure and thought as victorious—wasn't it so?

PROTARCHUS: It was.

SOCRATES: And as we surely see this kind of life, what it is and to which genus it belongs—

PROTARCHUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And we'll say, I suspect, it is a part of the third genus, for the third is not just of some two things, but of all unlimited things that have been bound by the limit; and hence this prizewinning life must rightly be a part of it.

PROTARCHUS: No, no, most rightly.

SOCRATES: Very well then. But what about yours, Philebus, pleasant and unmixed as it is? In what genus of the aforementioned should it so be spoken of, would it be rightly spoken of? But before you declare it, please answer me the following. E

PHILEBUS: Just speak.

SOCRATES: Does the pair pleasure and pain⁵⁹ have a limit, or do they as a pair belong to the things that receive the more and less?

PHILEBUS: Yes, Socrates, of the more, for unless it were in fact by nature unlimited in point of a manifold and the more, pleasure would not otherwise be totally good.

SOCRATES: Any more than pain, Philebus, would be totally bad 28A either. So the pair of us has to look at something else than the nature of the unlimited as that which supplies some part of good to the pleasures. I'll let you have this pair of yours as belonging to the genus of the limitless things; but as for thought, knowledge, and mind, Protarchus and Philebus—if we should now set them into which of the aforementioned things, would we not be committing an impiety? Whether we're right on track or not about the present question is in my opinion not a small risk for us.

PHILEBUS: That's because, Socrates, you're making your own god B august.

SOCRATES: And you're making your own [goddess august] as well, my comrade; but all the same we have to answer the question.

PROTARCHUS: Well, you know, Philebus, what Socrates says is right, and we have to obey him.

PHILEBUS: Well, have you not chosen, Protarchus, to speak on my behalf?

PROTARCHUS: For sure. Now, however, I'm pretty nearly at a loss, and I'm begging you, Socrates, you yourself become our mouth-piece,⁶⁰ in order that we don't miss the mark entirely and utter anything out of tune about your contestant.⁶¹

SOCRATES: I have to obey, Protarchus. And you're not enjoining a C difficult thing either. But did I really and truly trouble you in my

59. The phrase "pleasure(s) and pain(s)" occurs nine times (27E, 32C, 32D, 38B, 39D [twice], 42C [twice], 49A), always with the single connective *kai*; the phrase "pain(s) and pleasure(s)" occurs eighteen times, seventeen times with the double connective *te kai* (for which, see n. 48 above) and once with *kai* alone (42A). In the rest of Plato, "pain(s) and pleasure(s)" is to "pleasure(s) and pain(s)" as eight is to thirty, but "pain and pleasure" and "pleasure and pain" are each coupled with *te kai* seven times.

60. "Mouthpiece" is *prophētēs*, originally an interpreter of divine messages and signs.

61. To "miss the mark entirely" in regard to mind (*nous*) would involve *anoia* or folly.

august solemnity (as Philebus put it), while I was just being playful, when I asked to what genus mind and knowledge belonged?

PROTARCHUS: Yes, Socrates, absolutely.

SOCRATES: Yet it's easy. All the wise are in consonance on the point, in really and truly making themselves august, in saying that for us the king of heaven and earth is mind. And perhaps they speak well. Let's make, if you want, a longer investigation of the genus itself.

D PROTARCHUS: Speak however you want, and as for length, Socrates, don't take us into account. You won't incur our enmity.

SOCRATES: You put it beautifully, thank you. Let's make some sort of start by raising the following question.

PROTARCHUS: What?

SOCRATES: Are we to assert, Protarchus, that the power of the irrational and random—the arbitrarily haphazard—supervises all things and this so-called whole, or, on the contrary, just as those before us used to say, mind, and some amazing thought, arranges and pilots it throughout?

E PROTARCHUS: You amaze me, Socrates. They're not of the same order.⁶² The alternative you now speak of appears to me to be not even holy; but to assert that mind arranges and orders all of them is worthy of the sight of the cosmos, the sun, the moon, the stars, and the entire orbit [of the sky], and I for one would never speak otherwise about them or even have a different opinion.

29A SOCRATES: Do you want, then, for us too to confirm and agree with those before us that this is so, and believe we must not only speak the views of others without risk but also join them in the danger and share the blame, whenever a clever and terrible man says that this is not the way it is but it's in disorder?

PROTARCHUS: Of course I would want to.

SOCRATES: Come then, observe the account about these things that is now coming on us for the attack.

PROTARCHUS: Just speak.

SOCRATES: Now the elements that concern the nature of the bodies of all animals—we surely catch sight of fire, water, air, and, as those caught in a storm say, "Land!"—are in their composition.⁶³

62. The text reads "Nothing of the same things" or "It's nothing of the kind," which does not suit Protarchus's total rejection of the first possibility. "They're not of the same order" does not perhaps quite convey what one wants, namely, "There's nothing to the question"; but see *Hippias Minor* 372B.

63. Rather than simply list the four elements, Socrates makes a joke out of the fourth, earth, and pretends that, like sailors caught in a storm, they have just caught

PROTARCHUS: Yes indeed. In the present speeches, we're really and truly caught in a storm of perplexity. B

SOCRATES: Come then. In the case of each of these things among us, take each of them to be of the following kind.

PROTARCHUS: What kind?

SOCRATES: That [in the bodies of animals] each of them among us is small, paltry, in no way untainted to any degree, and without the power worthy of its nature. Take one and conceive the same about all. Fire, for example, is surely among us, and it is in the whole as well.

PROTARCHUS: Why of course.

SOCRATES: The fire among us is something small, weak, and paltry, but that [fire] in the whole is amazing in its vastness, beauty, and every power that pertains to fire. C

PROTARCHUS: What you say is very true.

SOCRATES: And what of this? Does the fire of the whole get nourished by the fire among us, and does it come to be from it and increase, or, on the contrary, does my fire, yours, and that of all other animals get and conceive all this from it?

PROTARCHUS: Now you're asking a question that does not even deserve an answer.

SOCRATES: Right. You'll say the same, I suspect, about the earth in animals here and the earth in the whole, and likewise about all the other elements I asked about a little while ago. Is this the way you'll answer? D

PROTARCHUS: Who would answer otherwise and be obviously healthy and sound?

SOCRATES: Pretty nearly no one whatsoever. But come along and follow the next point in order. Don't we actually give the name of body to all the elements we just now mentioned when we see them put together into one?

PROTARCHUS: Why of course.

SOCRATES: Then take the same about this—it is right before us—and we speak of it as a cosmos. In the same sense surely it must be body, being put together as it is out of the same thing. E

PROTARCHUS: What you say is most right.

SOCRATES: Well, in general, does the body among us get nurtured from that body, or that body and everything it has taken and has—

sight of land and shouted out "Land ahoy!" The joke sets up the contrast between the orderly sight of the sky, to which Protarchus has just appealed, and the poor stuff we are familiar with.

all we spoke of just now about its elements—do they get nurtured from the body among us?

PROTARCHUS: And this too, Socrates, is another question that does not deserve to be asked.

30A SOCRATES: What about this? Does it actually deserve to be asked? Or how will you say?

PROTARCHUS: Say what it is.

SOCRATES: Shall we actually say that the body among us has a soul?

PROTARCHUS: Clearly, we'll say it does.

SOCRATES: From what, my dear Protarchus, did it take it, unless the body of the whole were in fact ensouled, with just the same things as it and still more beautiful in every way?

PROTARCHUS: Clearly, Socrates, from nowhere else anywhere.

B SOCRATES: That's because, Protarchus, we surely don't think that those four—limit, unlimited, common, and the genus of cause, which is the fourth among all—that this, in supplying soul in the things among us and implanting corporeal exercise and, if and when the body stumbles, medicine, and in putting together different things in different things and curing them, gets called by the name of omnifarious wisdom in its entirety, but although these same things are in the whole sky and throughout its big parts, and are besides beautiful and untainted, then it has not contrived in them the nature of the most beautiful and most honorable things.⁶⁴

C PROTARCHUS: Well, it would not at least be in any way reasonable.

SOCRATES: Then if we are not saying this well, it would be better for us to say, in going along with that former account, that there are—it's what we have often said—an extensive unlimited in the whole and a satisfactory limit, and no inferior and shallow cause is presiding over them, ordering and arranging years, seasons, and months, and it is to be spoken of most justly as wisdom and mind.

PROTARCHUS: You said it, most justly.

SOCRATES: Yet the pair wisdom and mind would never come to be without soul?⁶⁵

64. Either the text is corrupt between "those four" and "that this," or, by an extraordinary anacoluthon, Socrates drops what he had intended to say and shifts to the cosmic animal as the cause of soul among us. The fact that in his next speech he offers an alternative to his pre-Socratic cosmology suggests that the anacoluthon can stand.

65. Compare *Sophist* 249a6–7: "Do we speak of both of them [mind and life] as being in it [that which perfectly is], yet we shall deny that it has them in soul?" Also, *Timaeus* 30b1–4: "[The demiurge] then discovered on the basis of reflection that of naturally visible things no mindless work as a whole would ever be more beautiful than a whole with mind, and that in turn it's impossible for mind to be present in anything apart from soul."

PROTARCHUS: No, it wouldn't.

SOCRATES: You will then say that on account of the power of the cause there comes to be in the nature of Zeus a soul as kingly as his mind is kingly, and there are different beautiful things in different [gods], however it is dear to each of them to be spoken of.

D

PROTARCHUS: Yes indeed.

SOCRATES: Let's not believe, then, Protarchus, that we have spoken this speech all in vain and to no purpose, but just as it is an ally to those who declared long ago that mind always rules the whole—

PROTARCHUS: Yes, it's an ally.

SOCRATES: So it has supplied an answer to my own investigation, that mind does belong to the genus of the nature of what is spoken of as the cause of all things; and we had the cause as one of our four.⁶⁶ So you surely have by now our answer.

E

PROTARCHUS: Indeed I do have it and very adequately, and yet I was unaware that you had given the answer.

SOCRATES: The reason for this, Protarchus, is that playfulness is sometimes a relaxation from seriousness.

PROTARCHUS: A beautiful point.

SOCRATES: Now then, my comrade, just as it has been made fairly clear by us to what genus mind belongs and what power it possesses—

31A

PROTARCHUS: Yes, of course.

SOCRATES: So likewise the genus of pleasure came to light some time ago.

PROTARCHUS: Indeed.

SOCRATES: Then let's remember this too about them both, that mind was akin to cause and pretty nearly of this genus, but pleasure in itself is unlimited and of the genus in and of itself that does not have and never will have a beginning, middle, or end.

PROTARCHUS: We'll remember. How could we not?

B

SOCRATES: The next point, then, is this. We have to see in what each of the pair is, and on account of what experience does the pair come to be whenever it comes to be. First pleasure. Just as we tested and put to the torture its genus first, so too we must examine these first,

66. Instead of *genous tis* (Diès's correction), the manuscripts and the entire indirect tradition (Damascius and the lexicographers) have the unintelligible word *genoustēs*. Cherniss "Some Wartime Publications Concerning Plato" (*American Journal of Philology* 68 [1947]: 225–34) pointed out that if Diès's correction is accepted, the phrase *nous esti genous tis* could be resegmented as *nous esti ge nous tis* (Mind is mind of some sort), and Socrates' remark about the playfulness of the present discussion would thus have a more pointed reference.

and apart from pain we would never be able to test pleasure adequately and put it to the torture.

PROTARCHUS: Well, if that's the route we must take, let's take it.

SOCRATES: Does it actually appear to you as it does to me about their genesis?

C PROTARCHUS: What?

SOCRATES: As a pair, pain and pleasure appear to me to come to be by nature in the common genus.

PROTARCHUS: But, dear Socrates, remind us of the common. Which of the aforementioned do you want to make clear?

SOCRATES: You surprise me, but it will be done to the best of my ability.

PROTARCHUS: Thank you, you put it beautifully.

SOCRATES: Well, then, let's hear by the word "common" just what we were speaking of as third of the four.

PROTARCHUS: Do you mean what you were speaking of after the unlimited and limit, in which you were putting health and, I suspect, harmony?

D SOCRATES: You put it most beautifully. But now pay the closest possible attention and apply your mind.

PROTARCHUS: Just speak.

SOCRATES: Well, then, I'm speaking no less of the dissolution of nature when the harmony in us animals is dissolving and the simultaneous genesis of pains at that time—

PROTARCHUS: You're speaking very reasonably.

SOCRATES: Than—if it has to be stated briefly and as quickly as possible about very great matters⁶⁷—when that nature is being fitted back together again and is returning to its own nature, we have to speak of the coming into being of pleasure.

E PROTARCHUS: Although I suspect, Socrates, that you are speaking rightly, all the same let's try to speak of these same points still more vividly.

SOCRATES: Surely it's easiest to conceive and think of the popular and conspicuous things.

PROTARCHUS: Which kinds?

SOCRATES: Just as hunger is surely a dissolution and a pain—

PROTARCHUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: So eating, in becoming a filling up once more, is a pleasure.⁶⁸

67. Of the nineteen instances of the word "greatest" (*megistos*), this is the only one translated as an elative, although it is almost always possible to do so.

68. Compare Aristotle *EN* 1173b7–12: "They say that pain is a natural deficiency, and pleasure a refilling; but these are corporeal effects. If pleasure is a natural refilling,

PROTARCHUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And thirst, in turn, is a corruption and a pain, and the power that refills the dried out with liquid is a pleasure; and again unnatural separation and dissolution—experiences of choking heat—are a pain; but the natural giving back and cooling are a pleasure.

32A

PROTARCHUS: Yes, of course.

SOCRATES: And while the unnatural freezing of the animal's liquidity is a painful chill, the natural way back of things that are separating out and returning to the same place is a pleasure. And consider whether the speech, in general, is a measured one in your eyes, whichever one claims that for the ensouled species, which, as I was saying before, has come to be by nature out of the unlimited and limit,⁶⁹ whenever it is corrupted, the corruption is a pain, but the going to their own being—this is the going back—is a pleasure for them all.

B

PROTARCHUS: Let it be. It seems to me that it does have a certain stamp on it.

SOCRATES: Well, then, in these experiences of either kind, are we to set this down as one species of pain and pleasure?

PROTARCHUS: Let it have been set down.

SOCRATES: Well, then, in terms of the expectation of these experiences, set them down as belonging to the soul itself, and whatever is expected before the pleasant things set it down as pleasant and making for confidence, and whatever is expected before the painful things set it down as frightening and painful.

C

PROTARCHUS: Indeed, that which occurs apart from the body and belongs to the soul itself through expectation is another species of pleasure and pain.

SOCRATES: You understand it rightly. I suspect it's in these uncontaminated experiences of pain and pleasure (as they are thought to be), and as they severally occur without any mixture, that the characteristic of pleasure will become evident, in my opinion at least, and whether the genus as a whole is to be welcomed and embraced, or, although we have to give this total welcome to some other

D

then that in which the refilling occurs would take pleasure, the body; but it is not thought so; so the refilling is not pleasure, but should there occur a refilling, one would take pleasure."

69. This is the last occurrence of "limit" (*peras*) in the dialogue. Of the thirty-nine instances of *peras* in Plato, twenty-two are in the *Philebus*; there is also one compound *peratōeides* (25D). The only other dialogue where there are more than one or two is the *Parmenides*; it has eight, all in the second half. In the *Philebus*, "limit" vanishes when "animal" is replaced by "body" and "soul."

of the aforementioned genera, still, just as in the case of hot and cold and everything of the kind, one has to cherish and embrace pleasure and pain at times, and at other times one must not welcome them, on the grounds that, although they are not good, there are times when some of them on occasion accept the nature of the goods.

PROTARCHUS: What you say is most right. What is now being pursued must be put as a perplexity somewhat along these lines.

- E SOCRATES: First off, then, let's take a synoptic look at this. If this statement really and truly holds, that when animals are being corrupted there is pain, and when they are being restored to safety there is pleasure, then let's reflect on what condition there must then be in each animal when it gets into the state in which it is being neither corrupted nor restored. Pay extreme close attention, apply your mind, and speak. Isn't there actually an entire necessity that every animal at that time neither be in any pain at all nor take any pleasure large or small?

PROTARCHUS: Yes, it's a necessity.

- 33A SOCRATES: Then a disposition of this kind is our third, no less beyond the disposition of the one who enjoys than beyond the disposition of the one who is in pain?

PROTARCHUS: Why of course.

SOCRATES: Come then, show your eagerness in remembering this third disposition, for in view of the judgment on pleasure it is not a small thing whether we remember it or not. But, if you want, let's go through some brief point about it right to the end [limit].

PROTARCHUS: Say what kind.

SOCRATES: You know that nothing stands in the way of the life of thoughtfulness being lived in this way.

- B PROTARCHUS: You mean the way of neither enjoying nor being in pain?

SOCRATES: Yes. The reason is that it was surely stated at that time, in the comparison of lives, that for him who chooses the life of thinking and thoughtfulness there had to be no enjoyment at all, either great or small.

PROTARCHUS: It was indeed stated in this way.

SOCRATES: So if this were so, it would be his from the start, and perhaps there's nothing strange if it is the most divine of all lives.

PROTARCHUS: It's unlikely at any rate for gods either to rejoice or the contrary.

SOCRATES: Of course it's unlikely; it is unseemly at any rate when

either of them occurs. But more to the point—although we'll go on to examine it at another time if it is at all relevant, and we'll apply it to mind for second prize if we are not able to attach first prize to it—

C

PROTARCHUS: You speak most rightly.

SOCRATES: There is that other species of pleasures, which we were saying was of the soul itself and which in its entirety has come to be through memory.

PROTARCHUS: How?

SOCRATES: We must take up memory first, it seems. Whatever is it? And it's once more probable that sensation too has to be treated even before memory, if in a proper way the things about them are going to become evident to us in some way or other.

PROTARCHUS: How do you mean?

D

SOCRATES: Set it down that some of the corporeal experiences we have on each occasion are quenched in the body before they get through to the soul and leave it unaffected, but the experiences that go through both set up an oscillation in them, as it were, which is peculiar and common to each of the two.

PROTARCHUS: Let it have been set down.

SOCRATES: So if we say that our soul is unaware (*lanthanein*) of those that do not go through both, but is not unaware (*lanthanein*) of those experiences that do go through both, shall we actually be speaking most rightly?

PROTARCHUS: Of course.

E

SOCRATES: Well, then, don't in any way suppose that I'm saying that to be in a state of unawareness (*lelēthenai*) is the genesis of forgetfulness (*lēthē*), for forgetfulness is the departure of memory, and it has not yet come to be in what is now being spoken of. To assert that some loss is occurring of that which neither is nor has yet come to be is strange, isn't it?

PROTARCHUS: Why of course.

SOCRATES: Well, then, just change the names.

PROTARCHUS: How?

SOCRATES: Instead of "the soul is in a state of unawareness," whenever it is unaffected by the oscillations of the body, name what you're now calling forgetfulness (*lēthē*) "insensitivity" (*anaisthēsia*).

34A

PROTARCHUS: I understand.

SOCRATES: And that which occurs in common in a single experience and in the joint motion of the soul and body, if you should in turn name this motion "sensation," you would not be speaking improperly.

PROTARCHUS: What you say is most true.

SOCRATES: Do we understand by now what we want to call sensation?

PROTARCHUS: Why of course.

SOCRATES: Well, then, should one say that memory is the preservation of sensation, then according to my opinion at least one would be speaking rightly.

B PROTARCHUS: Yes, rightly.

SOCRATES: Don't we actually speak of recollection as being different from memory?

PROTARCHUS: Perhaps.

SOCRATES: Isn't this the difference?

PROTARCHUS: What?

SOCRATES: We surely speak of the soul as then recollecting whenever it alone in itself resumes as far as it can without the body whatever it once was experiencing with the body. Isn't that so?

PROTARCHUS: Yes, of course.

C SOCRATES: And further, whenever it loses a memory, whether it be of a sensation or a matter of learning, and alone in itself ranges back and forth over it, we surely speak of all of these too as recollections.⁷⁰

PROTARCHUS: What you say is right.

SOCRATES: And why exactly has all this been stated? It's this.

PROTARCHUS: What?

SOCRATES: In order that in some sense or other we might grasp the pleasure of the soul, and along with it desire, apart from body, as vividly and precisely as possible. Both of them seem to be made clear somehow or other through these.

PROTARCHUS: Well, then, Socrates, let's speak of what follows after it.

D SOCRATES: It's necessary, it seems, in examining the genesis of pleasure and every shape it has,⁷¹ to speak at great length, for it now appears we must first take up desire. What in the world is it? And where does it come to be?

PROTARCHUS: Well, then, let's consider. We'll lose nothing.

70. The manuscripts add at the end "and memories." In the *Phaedo* 73d5–74a1, three kinds of recollection are described. The first is when, on seeing something, one recalls something else, particularly if one has forgotten that something else for some time. The second is when one sees the painted image of something and recalls something else. The third is when one sees the painted image of something and recalls that of which it is an image.

71. The word "shape" (*morphē*) occurred once before at 12C, but it does not show up again in the *Philebus*.

SOCRATES: No, no, Protarchus, we'll lose this at least: once we find what we're now seeking, we'll lose our perplexity about these very things.

PROTARCHUS: Your parry is adroit. So let's try to say what's the next order of business.

SOCRATES: Weren't we saying just now that hunger, thirst, and many others of the kind were certain desires? E

PROTARCHUS: Yes, exactly.

SOCRATES: When we address such very different things with a single name, what in the world is that same thing we look at?

PROTARCHUS: By Zeus, Socrates, it's not easy perhaps to say, but all the same we have to say it.

SOCRATES: Let's resume it from here and take it up once more from the same things.

PROTARCHUS: From where?

SOCRATES: We surely say on several occasions, "He's thirsty"?

PROTARCHUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And this is, "He's empty"?

PROTARCHUS: Why of course.

SOCRATES: Then thirst is actually a desire?

PROTARCHUS: Yes, of drink.

SOCRATES: Of drink or the filling of drink? 35A

PROTARCHUS: Well, I suspect, of filling.

SOCRATES: Then whoever of us is empty desires, it seems, things contrary to what he is experiencing, for in being empty he loves to be filled.

PROTARCHUS: Yes, most plainly.

SOCRATES: What about the one who is empty to begin with?⁷² Where would he be in touch with fulfillment? Would it be either by sensation or by memory, when this is something he neither experiences in the present time nor ever experienced in the past?

PROTARCHUS: How could he?

SOCRATES: But still he who is desiring desires something, we say. B

PROTARCHUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: Then it is, after all, just what he's not experiencing that he's desiring. He thirsts, and this is emptiness; and he desires fulfillment.

PROTARCHUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: So something, after all, of the things of the thirsty must be in touch in some sense or other with fulfillment.

PROTARCHUS: It's necessary.

72. This is often translated "the one who is empty for the first time."

SOCRATES: Now it's impossible that it be the body, for surely it is empty.

PROTARCHUS: Yes.

C SOCRATES: Then the only thing left to be in touch with fulfillment is, after all, the soul, and clearly by memory, for by what else would it still be in touch?

PROTARCHUS: Pretty nearly by nothing else.

SOCRATES: Do we then understand what the result has been for us from these arguments?

PROTARCHUS: What?

SOCRATES: This argument of ours denies that desire is of body.

PROTARCHUS: How?

SOCRATES: Because it reveals that the attempt of every animal is always contrary to its experiences.

PROTARCHUS: Indeed.

SOCRATES: And the impulse that leads in the direction contrary to the experiences surely makes clear that there is a memory of things contrary to the experiences.

PROTARCHUS: Of course.

D SOCRATES: Then the argument, which proves that it's the memory that leads toward the things desired, reveals that the impulse, desire, and originating principle of the animal as a whole belong in their entirety to soul.

PROTARCHUS: Most rightly.

SOCRATES: Then the argument denies that in any way our body thirsts, hungers, or experiences anything of the kind.

PROTARCHUS: Most true.

SOCRATES: Let's make one further reflection on these same points. It appears to me that the argument wants to make clear to us that a certain species of life is engaged in these very things—

E PROTARCHUS: In what things? What kind of a life are you pointing to?

SOCRATES: In getting filled and getting empty, and everything concerned with the preservation and destruction of animals, and whenever any of us gets involved in either of them and experiences pain, and at times joy, at the changes.

PROTARCHUS: These things are so.

SOCRATES: What about when one is in the middle of them?

PROTARCHUS: How do you mean, "in the middle?"

SOCRATES: Although he is in pain on account of the experience, still he remembers the pleasant things, and were they to occur, he

would cease from the pain, but he is not yet filled. What about at that time? Are we to assert or are we to deny that he is the middle of his experiences?

36A

PROTARCHUS: Let's assert it, of course.

SOCRATES: Is he wholly in pain or enjoyment?

PROTARCHUS: Not the latter, by Zeus, but he is experiencing some double pain: in terms of the body in the course of his experience, and in terms of the soul by a certain longing of expectation.

SOCRATES: How did you mean, Protarchus, the doubleness of the pain? Aren't there actually times when one of us, in being empty, stands in plain hope of a future fulfillment, and at other times, on the contrary, one is without hope?

B

PROTARCHUS: Yes indeed.

SOCRATES: Don't you think, then, that in hoping to be fulfilled he rejoices by his remembering, but in being at the same time empty he is in pain?⁷³

PROTARCHUS: It's a necessity.

SOCRATES: Then at that time a human being and all other animals are in pain and rejoice simultaneously.

PROTARCHUS: It's probable.

SOCRATES: What about when, in being empty, he has no hope of achieving fulfillment? Wouldn't the double experience of pains actually occur at that time? Is this what you caught sight of just now and suspected to be singly double?⁷⁴

C

PROTARCHUS: Most true, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Let's then use this investigation of those experiences as follows.

PROTARCHUS: How?

SOCRATES: Are we to say that these pains and pleasures are true or false? Or that some are true, and some not?

PROTARCHUS: But how, Socrates, would pleasures or pains be false?

SOCRATES: But how, Protarchus, would fears be true or false, or expectations true or not, or opinions true or false?

PROTARCHUS: Opinions, yes, I would surely concede it in their case, but as for the others I wouldn't.

D

SOCRATES: What's your claim? It's probable in any case that we're stirring up some scarcely small argument.

73. In the last clause, the manuscripts read "in these times," but Badham deleted "times."

74. "Singly double," i.e., double without qualification, is meant to convey Socrates' play on "double" (*diploûn*) and "simply" (*haplōs*).

PROTARCHUS: What you say is true.

SOCRATES: Well, if the argument is appropriate in light of what has gone before, Oh son of that man,⁷⁵ one has to consider it.

PROTARCHUS: Yes, perhaps then.

SOCRATES: Well, then, we have to dismiss all other lengths or anything else whatsoever if they're spoken contrary to what's appropriate.⁷⁶

PROTARCHUS: Right.

E SOCRATES: So tell me. A complete and continuous amazement has always held me in its grip about the same perplexities we just now proposed. How do you put it? Are pleasures false, and some pleasures, are they true?⁷⁷

PROTARCHUS: Yes, how could they be?

SOCRATES: Then neither in a dream nor awake, as you assert, neither in fits of madness nor on occasions of distraction is there anyone who ever imagines he enjoys but is not enjoying in any way, any more than he imagines he is in pain but is not in pain?⁷⁸

PROTARCHUS: All of us, Socrates, have supposed that all of this is so.

SOCRATES: Is it actually right then? Or should we examine whether this is spoken of rightly or not?

PROTARCHUS: We must examine it, as I for one would say.

37A SOCRATES: Then let's make a still plainer determination and discrimination of what is now being said about pleasure and opinion. To opine is surely something for us?

PROTARCHUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And to take pleasure?

PROTARCHUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And further that which is opined is also something?

75. This has been taken in three ways: literally, of Protarchus's father Callias, now deceased; of Philebus; or of Gorgias, as a facetious reference to Gorgias's claim to be able to speak at length or succinctly. The first possibility is the most plausible.

76. "To dismiss" (*khairein*) is literally "to enjoy," for, in serving no less for "good-bye" than "hello," *khairein* comes to signify dismissal. Both here and at 16E, Socrates is consistent in associating the unlimited with pleasure; but look at 59B and n. 137 below.

77. Rather than framing Protarchus's question straightforwardly—"Are some pleasures false and others true?"—Socrates drops the balancing particle *men* (on the one hand), so that Protarchus seems to be asking whether all pleasures are false, and then as an afterthought whether there are some that are true. This is a rather common device in Plato for pointing to a genuine difficulty (cf. *Sophist* 248A). In the *Philebus*, the omission of *men* occurs again at 66C.

78. Compare *Theaetetus* (157E–158A), where, once Theaetetus accepts Protagorean relativism, he is stymied by the obvious examples of dreaming and madness in which we talk about misperceptions.

PROTARCHUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: As well as that in which what takes pleasure takes pleasure?

PROTARCHUS: Yes, that too.

SOCRATES: And what is doing the opining, regardless of whether it opines rightly or not rightly, never at least loses the fact that it is really and truly opining?

PROTARCHUS: How could it?

B

SOCRATES: Isn't it clearly the case, then, that what is taking pleasure, regardless of whether it takes pleasure rightly or not rightly, will never lose at least the fact that it is really and truly taking pleasure?

PROTARCHUS: Yes, this too is so.

SOCRATES: How in the world, then, is false and true opinion a usual occurrence for us,⁷⁹ but pleasure is characterized only by truth, although "really and truly" has fallen to the lot of both of them alike—taking pleasure and opining? Do we have to examine it?

PROTARCHUS: We have to examine it.

SOCRATES: Are you actually saying we have to examine this? That just as falsehood and truth supervene on opinion, and on account of this an opinion not only comes to be, but each opinion becomes of a certain kind—

C

PROTARCHUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: So besides that, whether in general some things are for us of a certain kind, but pleasure and pain are only just what they are, and the pair of them does not become of a certain kind? Do we have to come to an agreement about this too?

PROTARCHUS: Clearly.

SOCRATES: It's not at all hard to see this at least, that the pair is of a certain kind too, for some time ago we said that pains and pleasures severally become great and small and do so to an extreme degree.

PROTARCHUS: Absolutely.

D

SOCRATES: And if wickedness, Protarchus, comes in addition to any one of them, we'll assert, if this is the case, that an opinion becomes wicked, and a pleasure also becomes wicked.

PROTARCHUS: Why of course, Socrates.

SOCRATES: But what if rightness or the contrary to rightness comes in addition to any one of them? Shall we not speak of right opinion, if it gains rightness, and say the same of pleasure?

PROTARCHUS: It's necessary.

79. "Usual" translates the verb *philei*, which apart from this idiomatic use means "to be a friend" or "to love."

E SOCRATES: And if the thing opined is mistaken, mustn't one agree that the opinion then is in error and not right, and it is not opining rightly either?

PROTARCHUS: How else would it be?

SOCRATES: And what of this? If we detect some pain, in its involvement with that for which there is pain, in error, or its contrary, pleasure, in error, shall we apply "right" or "good" or any of the beautiful names to it?

PROTARCHUS: Well, it's impossible, if, that is, pleasure will be in error.

SOCRATES: And yet it does look as if pleasure often comes to be for us not with right opinion but with falsehood.

38A PROTARCHUS: Of course it does. In a situation of that kind, Socrates, we speak of the opinion as false at that time, but no one would ever address the pleasure itself as false.

SOCRATES: Well, Protarchus, you're eagerly defending the speech of pleasure now.

PROTARCHUS: No, not at all, but I speak just as I hear it spoken.

SOCRATES: Does the pleasure, my comrade, which is with right opinion and with knowledge, not at all differ for us from the pleasure that often comes to be in each of us with falsehood and ignorance?

B PROTARCHUS: It's likely at any rate that the difference is not small.

SOCRATES: Let's go and take a look at the difference in the pair.

PROTARCHUS: Take the lead wherever it comes to light for you.

SOCRATES: I'm leading, then, in the following direction.

PROTARCHUS: Where?

SOCRATES: Opinion, we say, is false for us, but there is also true?

PROTARCHUS: There is.

SOCRATES: And, as we were saying just now, pleasure and pain often go along with them, I mean true and false opinion.

PROTARCHUS: Sure.

SOCRATES: Isn't it the case that opinion and the attempt to decide among opinions⁸⁰ come to be for us on each occasion out of memory and sensation?

C PROTARCHUS: Indeed.

SOCRATES: Don't we actually believe, then, that we necessarily are in the following state about them?

80. "To decide among opinions" is *diadoxazein*, which does not occur elsewhere in Plato or any other Attic author; but it seems to be modeled on *dieidenai*, "to know by distinguishing," and *diadokimazein*, "to distinguish by testing."

PROTARCHUS: What?

SOCRATES: Would you say that someone, on seeing at a distance things that are not very plainly caught sight of, often conceives the wish to make a judgment on the very things he is seeing below him?

PROTARCHUS: I would say so.

SOCRATES: Then would he after this on his own put a question to himself like this?

PROTARCHUS: Like what?

SOCRATES: "What in the world, then, is that apparition standing by the rock under some tree?" Do you think that once he had at any time caught sight of some apparitions of this kind he would say this to himself? D

PROTARCHUS: Why of course.

SOCRATES: And afterward, would someone like that actually say to himself as if he were answering, "It is a human being," and by a lucky hit tell the truth?

PROTARCHUS: For sure.

SOCRATES: And might he, in turn, be thrown off course perhaps and, in the mistaken belief that what is being seen below him is the work of some shepherds, declare, "Statue"?

PROTARCHUS: Yes, certainly.

SOCRATES: And were someone else by his side, he might, on putting what he stated to himself into sound, once more utter these very things to the bystander, and, just like that, what we were then calling an opinion has become in this way a speech?⁸¹ E

PROTARCHUS: Why of course.

SOCRATES: So too, on occasion, if after all he were alone and were to think this same thing to himself, he goes around for a longer time with it in himself.

PROTARCHUS: Yes, of course.

SOCRATES: What then? Does it actually appear to you as it does to me about them?

PROTARCHUS: What?

SOCRATES: I think that our soul at that time resembles a kind of book.

PROTARCHUS: How? xx

SOCRATES: It appears to me that those experiences that are involved with memory and sensations, on the occasion of the coincidence of 39A

81. Compare the definitions of thought, opinion, and speech in the *Sophist* 263D–264A.

memory and sensations, come pretty close at that time to writing as it were speeches in our souls; and whenever this kind of experience is writing true things, the result in us from it is the coming into being of true opinion and true speeches, and whenever the secretary whom we have at home with us and who is of this kind writes false things, then the contrary to the true results.

B PROTARCHUS: Of course I think so, and I accept it as formulated.

SOCRATES: Then accept as well another kind of craftsman in our souls who comes to be at that time.

PROTARCHUS: Whom?

SOCRATES: A painter,⁸² who, after the secretary of our speeches,⁸³ paints [writes] images of them in the soul.

PROTARCHUS: How exactly are we speaking of him and when?

C SOCRATES: Whenever someone, away from sight or some different sensation, withdraws what was then opined and said, and somehow or other sees in himself the images of the things once opined and spoken of. Or doesn't this come to be in us?

PROTARCHUS: Yes, exactly.

SOCRATES: Isn't it the case that the images of true opinions and speeches are true, and those of the false false?

PROTARCHUS: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: Then if we've said this rightly, let's go on to examine this further point in their case.

PROTARCHUS: What?

SOCRATES: Whether it's necessary for us to experience this kind of thing about the things that are and the things that have been, but not about the things that are going to be.

PROTARCHUS: No, no, it's the same for all times alike.

D SOCRATES: Wasn't it stated in the previous account that the pleasures and pains through the soul itself, prior to the pleasures and pains through the body, would first come to be, and the result for us is that there is the occurrence of anticipatory enjoyment and anticipatory pain about future time?

PROTARCHUS: Most true.

E SOCRATES: Are the writings [letters] and paintings, then, which just a little while ago we set down as becoming in us, about the past and the present time, but not about the future?

PROTARCHUS: Yes, exactly.

82. "Painter" is *zōgraphos*, "a painter of animals"; but the first element *zō-* is from *zōon*, which comes to mean "picture."

83. "Secretary" (*grammatistēs*), which also translates *grammateus* just above, is cognate with the verb "to write" (*graphō*).

SOCRATES: Do you actually mean by "exactly" that all these are hopes directed to the time hereafter, and that we, in turn, throughout our entire life, are always full of hopes?

PROTARCHUS: Yes, absolutely.

SOCRATES: Then come, besides what has now been said, answer the following as well.

PROTARCHUS: What?

SOCRATES: A just man, pious and good in all ways, isn't he actually dear to the gods?⁸⁴

PROTARCHUS: Why of course.

SOCRATES: But what of this? An unjust and absolutely bad man, isn't he actually the contrary to him? 40A

PROTARCHUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: Still, every human being, as we were saying just now, is full of many hopes.

PROTARCHUS: Why not?

SOCRATES: Further, there are speeches in each of us to which we give the name "hopes"?

PROTARCHUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: As well as painted apparitions? And one often sees an abundance of gold accruing to oneself and the many pleasures of it? And in particular one catches sight of oneself, set in a painting before oneself, enjoying oneself extremely?

PROTARCHUS: Why not? B

SOCRATES: Are we to say, then, that the paintings [writings], for those who are good, are set before them for the most part as true, because they are dear to the gods, but for the bad in turn it's very much the contrary? Or are we to deny it?

PROTARCHUS: We must indeed affirm it.

SOCRATES: Then for the bad too pleasures are present in paintings no less, but they are surely false.

PROTARCHUS: Why of course.

SOCRATES: The wicked, then, often rejoice in false pleasures, but the good among human beings rejoice in true. C

PROTARCHUS: What you say is most necessary.

SOCRATES: So there are, then, according to the present arguments, false pleasures in the souls of human beings; they are, however,

84. The placement of the adverb "in all ways" (*pantōs*) allows it to be taken also with "dear to the gods," but, since the parallel adverb "absolutely" (*pantapasin*) in Socrates' next question must be taken with "bad," it is safer to keep the symmetry. It might be remarked that, if the parts have been distributed correctly, Socrates' question and Protarchus's answer are almost at the exact center of the dialogue.

imitations of the true pleasures with more laughable results, and pains likewise.

PROTARCHUS: There are.

SOCRATES: Wasn't it agreed, then, that to really and truly opine belongs to anyone who is ever opining at all, but sometimes it's not for things that are, it's not for things that have been, and it's not for the things that will be?

PROTARCHUS: Sure.

- D SOCRATES: And it was agreed as well, I suspect, that these things, in producing a false opinion at that time, also produce the fact of opining falsely. Isn't that so?

PROTARCHUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: What then? Mustn't we give back in turn to the pains and pleasures the corresponding condition—the nonbeing of the future, past, and present—in cases of anticipatory enjoyment, past enjoyment, and present enjoyment?⁸⁵

PROTARCHUS: How?

SOCRATES: That it was possible for anyone who rejoices in any way at all and quite at random to rejoice at all times really and truly, but at times, however, to rejoice not at things that are any more than at things that have been, and perhaps most often and repeatedly at things that are never going to happen.

- E PROTARCHUS: It's necessary, Socrates, that this too be the case.

SOCRATES: Then mustn't the same speech, "All things of the kind are also sometimes false," apply to occasions of fear, fits of rage, and everything of the kind?

PROTARCHUS: Yes, of course.

SOCRATES: What about this? Can we speak of wicked opinions as proving to be so in any other way than by their becoming false?⁸⁶

PROTARCHUS: In no other way.

SOCRATES: Any more than we conceive of pleasures either, I suspect, as wicked in any other way except by their being false.

- 41A PROTARCHUS: No, no, it's quite the contrary of what you have said, Socrates. One would scarcely set down wicked pains and pleasures as close to falsehood, but as coincident with a different and vast wickedness of great size.

85. In the Greek, for the phrase "the nonbeing of . . . present" there is simply "these things," which is governed grammatically by "corresponding condition," and for "in cases of . . . present enjoyment," there is "in those things."

86. The manuscripts have "and good" after "wicked opinions," as if after "becoming false" Socrates were going to add "and true"; but such an ellipse seems impossible, and it is safer to delete "and good."

SOCRATES: Well, then, if the pair of us still think we should, we'll speak a little later of those wicked pleasures that are, on account of wickedness, of that kind; but we have to speak of the many false pleasures that often in a different way are and come to be in us, for we'll use it perhaps for the series of judgments. B

PROTARCHUS: No doubt we will, if, that is, they are.

SOCRATES: Well, Protarchus, they are in my opinion at least, and as long as this opinion is lodged in us, it's surely impossible to let it be untested.

PROTARCHUS: Beautiful.

SOCRATES: Let's go and, like prizefighters, stand toe to toe over against this argument.

PROTARCHUS: Let's go.

SOCRATES: Well, we said a little while ago in the previous argument, if we remember, that whenever the so-called desires are in us, the body at that time has been pulled apart and stands separate from the soul while being held in the grip of its experiences. C

PROTARCHUS: We remember, and it was stated before.

SOCRATES: Wasn't the element desiring the conditions contrary to the body the soul, and the element supplying some pain or pleasure on account of an experience the body?

PROTARCHUS: Yes, it was.

SOCRATES: Then figure out what occurs in these experiences.

PROTARCHUS: Speak.

SOCRATES: Well, then, whenever these conditions hold, pains and pleasures come to be set alongside one another simultaneously, and, as it just now came to light, of these contraries [pleasure and pain] sensations simultaneously arise relative to one another. D

PROTARCHUS: It appears so at any rate.

SOCRATES: Hasn't this too been said and set down before as a common agreement by us?

PROTARCHUS: What?

SOCRATES: That both of this pair, pain and pleasure, receive the more and less, and as a pair they belong to the unlimited things?

PROTARCHUS: It has been said. Why?

SOCRATES: What possibility is there that these things be judged rightly?

PROTARCHUS: At what point exactly and how? E

SOCRATES: Where we have the wish in circumstances of this kind for a judgment on them, and one wants on each occasion to discriminate among them—pain in comparison with pleasure, pain in comparison with pain, and pleasure in comparison with pleasure—and

decide which of them in comparison with one another is bigger, which less, and which is more or less extreme.

PROTARCHUS: Well, these things are of this kind, and there is this kind of wish for a judgment.

42A SOCRATES: What then? In the case of sight, does the fact of seeing magnitudes at a distance or close up make the truth vanish and make us opine falsely, but in the case of pains and pleasures, after all, this same thing does not occur?

PROTARCHUS: No, no, Socrates, it's much more rather.

SOCRATES: Now this has proved to be the contrary of what happened a little while ago.

PROTARCHUS: What do you mean?

SOCRATES: Although at that time those false and true opinions, when they occurred, were agreed to infect the pains and pleasures at the same time with the experience they had—

B PROTARCHUS: Most true.

SOCRATES: But now the pleasures and pains on their own, because their occasional changes are being observed at a distance or close up, and at the same time they are being placed side by side, the pleasures appear greater and more extreme in comparison with the painful, and the pains, in turn, because they are seen in comparison with pleasures undergo the contrary to them.

PROTARCHUS: It's a necessity that things of this kind occur on account of it.

SOCRATES: Then to the degree to which pains or pleasures severally appear greater than they are or less, when you cut away this apparent part of either (and it's not the part that is), you won't say of it that it is appearing rightly, any more than in turn you will bring yourself to say of the part of pleasure and pain that extends over it that it is becoming right and true.

C

PROTARCHUS: No indeed, I won't.

SOCRATES: Well, then, next in order, we'll see whether in the following way we come across pleasures and pains, which appear and are in animals, that are false to a still greater degree than those.

PROTARCHUS: Which kind exactly, and how do you mean it?

SOCRATES: Surely it has been often stated that just as when the nature of each is being corrupted—by disjunctions and conjunctions, fillings and emptyings, and certain increases and decreases—pains, sufferings, distresses,⁸⁷ and everything with names of this kind are

D

87. Of these three terms, the first, *lupē*, is the most common both in the *Philebus* and

throughout Plato; the second, *algēdon*, occurs seven times in the *Philebus* (31D, 32E, 35E,

PROTARCHUS: Yes, it has been often stated.

SOCRATES: So, in turn, whenever there is a restoring to their own nature, we accept from ourselves this kind of restoration as pleasure.

PROTARCHUS: Right.

SOCRATES: But what about when in regard to the body none of these things is occurring and belongs to us?

PROTARCHUS: And when would that be, Socrates?

SOCRATES: That's not at all to the point, Protarchus, the question you now asked. E

PROTARCHUS: Why exactly?

SOCRATES: Because you're not preventing me from asking you my question once more.

PROTARCHUS: Which?

SOCRATES: Regardless of whether this kind of thing should not occur, Protarchus, I shall say, what necessarily results from it for us?

PROTARCHUS: You mean if the body is not moving in either direction?

SOCRATES: Just so.

PROTARCHUS: What's at least clear is this, Socrates: neither pleasure nor any pain would ever come to be in a state of this kind.

SOCRATES: You speak most beautifully. But I suspect what you really meant was this, that it's always necessary for something of these things to befall us, for, as the wise assert, all things are always flowing up and down [topsy-turvy]. 43A

PROTARCHUS: Indeed, they do say so, and they're not thought of as speaking in any shallow way.

SOCRATES: How could they? Unless they are shallow themselves? But I want to get out from under and step aside from this argument that's hurtling toward us. So I'm thinking of fleeing it in this direction, and you join me in my flight.

PROTARCHUS: In what direction? Do tell.

SOCRATES: Well, then, let's say to them: "Let it be so." But you [Protarchus] answer whether, in the case of the experiences of any of the ensouled beings, the one experiencing them is always aware of all of them, and it's not the case that we are unaware of our own growth and other experiences of the kind, or it's entirely to the contrary. B

41C, 42D, 52A [twice]); and the last, *odunē*, occurs only twice (here and at 51A), although in the myth of the *Phaedrus* it occurs five times.

PROTARCHUS: Surely it's all to the contrary. We are almost entirely unaware of everything of the kind.

SOCRATES: Well, then, the present statement, "The up and down occurrence of changes produces pains and pleasures," has not been beautifully stated by us.

PROTARCHUS: No of course.

C SOCRATES: It will be more beautifully stated as follows and be less subject to assault.

PROTARCHUS: How?

SOCRATES: "Great changes make pains and pleasures for us, but the measured and small ones are absolutely ineffective either way."

PROTARCHUS: It's more right in this way, Socrates, than formerly.

SOCRATES: Then if this is so, the life just now spoken of would return once more.

PROTARCHUS: Which?

SOCRATES: Which we were saying was painless and without joys.⁸⁸

PROTARCHUS: What you say is most true.

D SOCRATES: On this basis let's set down for ourselves three lives, one pleasant, one painful, and one neither.⁸⁹ Or how would you speak about them?

PROTARCHUS: Not in any different way than this, the lives are three.

SOCRATES: Then not to be in pain would never be the same as to enjoy?

PROTARCHUS: How could it?

SOCRATES: Then whenever you hear, "To live one's entire life painlessly is the pleasantest of all,"⁹⁰ what do you suppose a person like that is saying at the time?

PROTARCHUS: It appears to me that he's saying that not to be in pain is pleasant.

88. *Kharmonai* (joys) is found mostly in tragic poetry and does not recur in Plato.

89. For this whole argument, see *Republic* 583C–584B, and in particular 584a4–b6: "How, then, is it possible to believe rightly that not to be in pain is pleasant or not to enjoy is painful?" "In no way." "So this is not after all, but rest appears at that time," I said, "as pleasant in comparison with the painful and painful in comparison with the pleasant, and none of these hallucinations (*phantasmata*) is sound in light of the truth of pleasure, but it's a kind of enchantment." "So at least the argument indicates," he said. "Well, then," I said, "look at pleasures that are not from pains, lest perhaps you come to believe at the moment that this is the way it is by nature, that pleasure is the cessation of pain, and pain of pleasure." "Where am I to look?" he said, "and what kinds do you mean?" "Though there are many others," I said, "it's especially clear if you're willing to think of the pleasures of odors. To one who is not in any prior pain these suddenly arise as inconceivably grand, and on their cessation they leave behind no pain."

90. This is the sole occurrence of the superlative of "pleasant" in the dialogue. The superlative of "painful" does not occur even once.

SOCRATES: Then, just as in the case of any three you want, so for our three, in order that we may use more beautiful names, set down one as gold, one as silver, and the third as neither of these. E

PROTARCHUS: They have been set.

SOCRATES: Is it at all possible for us, then, that that which is neither would be either of the others, gold or silver?

PROTARCHUS: Well, how could it?

SOCRATES: So the middle life, after all, if it's in conformity with correct speech, should it be spoken of as either pleasant or painful, would never be opined rightly, should one so opine it, nor spoken of rightly, should one say it.

PROTARCHUS: How could it?

SOCRATES: But still and all, my comrade, we are aware [perceive] that people say this and opine it. 44A

PROTARCHUS: Indeed.

SOCRATES: Do they then believe they're enjoying at that time when they're not in pain?

PROTARCHUS: They say so at any rate.

SOCRATES: Then they do believe they're enjoying at the time, for they surely wouldn't be saying so otherwise.

PROTARCHUS: It's probable.

SOCRATES: Still, they're opining false things about their enjoyment, if the nature of the pair—not to be in pain and to enjoy—is apart.

PROTARCHUS: Yes, it was agreed it was apart.

SOCRATES: Are we to choose these things of ours to be three, as they were just now, or only two, as pain is bad for human beings, so the release from pains, this very thing in being good, is to be addressed as pleasant? B

PROTARCHUS: How exactly are we being asked this by ourselves, Socrates? I don't understand.

SOCRATES: That's because you don't understand those who are really and truly the enemies of Philebus here, Protarchus.

PROTARCHUS: Who do you say they are?

SOCRATES: They are spoken of as very clever when it comes to the things about nature,⁹¹ and they deny there are pleasures altogether.

PROTARCHUS: What are they then?

SOCRATES: They say that what the circle of Philebus now call pleasures are all flights from pains. C

91. It seems possible that "clever" means here "terrifying" and that "the things about nature" refers not to any cosmology but to their own nature; the translation would then run: "They are spoken of as very terrifying in their nature."

PROTARCHUS: Are you advising us, Socrates, to go along with them?
Or how?

D SOCRATES: No, but my advice is to use them as diviners of a kind, divining not by art but by a certain revulsion of a not ignoble nature. They have an inveterate and excessive hatred of the power of pleasure and maintain there's nothing sound in it, so as for this very attractiveness of it not to be pleasure but an enchantment. Now once you've considered the other points of their revulsion as well,⁹² you might make use of them in this regard; and after that you'll hear what I think are the true pleasures, in order that, once we've examined the power of pleasure on the basis of this pair of arguments, we may set them side by side for the judgment.

PROTARCHUS: A good suggestion [what you say is right].

E SOCRATES: Then let's follow in their steps, as if they were allies, on the track of their own revulsion. I suspect they speak somewhat as follows, in beginning from someplace above: "If we should want to see the nature of any species whatsoever—the nature of the hard, for example—would we come to a better⁹³ understanding of it if we should look away from everything else and concentrate on the hardest things, or on those that are a fractional part of them in point of hardness?" You must, Protarchus, just as if you were answering me, answer these peevish folk [who find things hard to digest].

PROTARCHUS: Yes, of course, and I tell them that we must look to things that are first in magnitude.

45A SOCRATES: Then if we should want to see the genus of pleasure as well, what nature it has, we should not turn our gaze on fractional pleasures but on the so-called topmost and most extreme.

PROTARCHUS: Everyone would now concede this to you.

SOCRATES: Well, the pleasures that are ready at hand, and that are also the greatest of pleasures, aren't they actually, as we commonly say, those of the body?

PROTARCHUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: Are they and do they become greater for those laboring

92. "Revolutions" (*duskherasmata*) is an odd formation and seems to be Plato's own; Pollux at any rate disapproves of it (*Onomasticon* 3.133). Insofar as *duskhereia* is often used of a perplexity (*aporia*), there is a suggestive union of pain and thought in *duskherasmata*; a slight overtranslation would be "stomach-turning difficulties." I follow M. Schofield ("Who Were *hoi duskhereis* in Plato *Philebus* 44a ff?" *Museum Helveticum* 28 (1971): 2–20) in giving a strong sense to *duskherēs*—particularly of one who finds food hard to digest—and *duskhereia*—"revulsion" or "disgust"—(especially in light of 66E) but without accepting his view that Socrates is referring to Speusippus.

93. "Better" is in Greek here *mallon*, which is used for "better" when it is coupled with a verb of seeing or understanding; the usage recurs at 54A.

in illness or for those in health? Let's be cautious, lest we answer precipitously and stumble in one way or another. Perhaps we would say the healthy.

B

PROTARCHUS: Yes, it's likely.

SOCRATES: What of this? If the desires preceding them prove the greatest, don't those pleasures surpass all others?

PROTARCHUS: Yes, this is true.

SOCRATES: Well, the feverish and those caught in the grip of illnesses of this kind, don't they thirst and shiver more, and everything they're accustomed to experience through the body, don't they experience all of it more? Don't they live with neediness to a greater extent, and conceive greater pleasures when they're being filled? Or shall we deny that this is true?

PROTARCHUS: Yes, of course, now that it's stated, it appears so.

SOCRATES: What then? Should we say that were anyone to want to see the greatest pleasures, they must proceed for the examination not to health but to illness, would we evidently be speaking rightly? Make sure you don't believe I have this in mind, and I'm asking you whether the extremely ill rejoice more than the healthy, but suppose I'm seeking the magnitude of pleasure, and where on each occasion the intensity in regard to something of the kind occurs. We must, we're saying, conceive of what nature it has, and what they say it is who assert that it altogether is not.

C

PROTARCHUS: Well, I'm pretty nearly following your argument.

D

SOCRATES: Soon, Protarchus, you'll be in the lead and showing the way. Just answer: do you see greater pleasures in hubris—I don't mean more, but exceeding by the intensity and the more—or in the moderate life? Put your mind to it and speak.

PROTARCHUS: Well, I understand what you're saying, and the difference, I see, is overwhelming. The proverbial speech—it urges "Nothing too much"—no doubt checks the moderate on each occasion, and they obey it; but what characterizes the senseless and hubristic is that extreme pleasure takes possession of them to the point of madness and makes them no less notorious than boisterous.⁹⁴

E

SOCRATES: Beautiful. And if this is so, then it's clearly in some wickedness of soul and the body but not in virtue that the greatest pleasures as well as the greatest pains come to be.

PROTARCHUS: Yes, of course.

94. *Periboētoi* has two meanings, "to be talked about" if it is taken as a passive or, unusually, as an active, "to shout all around."

SOCRATES: We should, then, choose some of these and, in our saying they were the greatest, examine in what way they are that.

46A PROTARCHUS: It's a necessity.

SOCRATES: Examine, then, the pleasures of the following kinds of illnesses, in what way they are.

PROTARCHUS: Which illnesses?

SOCRATES: The pleasures of the indecent illnesses, which those we spoke of as the peevish hate to perfection.

PROTARCHUS: Which pleasures?

SOCRATES: The cures of itching, for example, by rubbing, and everything of the kind that has no need of a different kind of remedy. This experience—O! by the gods!—what in the world are we to say it is when it arises in us? Pleasure or pain?

PROTARCHUS: It looks, at any rate, Socrates, as if this is an evil that occurs in a mixture.

B SOCRATES: It wasn't simply for Philebus's sake that I served up this argument, but without these pleasures, Protarchus, and those that come along with them, we would scarcely ever be able, if they are not caught sight of, to arrange for a decision on what is now being sought once and for all.

PROTARCHUS: Then we have to advance against the pleasures akin to them.

SOCRATES: You mean pleasures that share in the mixture?

PROTARCHUS: Yes, of course.

C SOCRATES: Well, then, some mixtures are in terms of the body in bodies alone, and some belong to the soul itself and are in the soul; and we'll find, in turn, in the case of pains of the soul and the body that, in their mixture with pleasures, both together are called at times pleasures and at times pains.

PROTARCHUS: How?

SOCRATES: Whenever anyone experiences simultaneously contrary experiences in restoration or corruption, when suffering from a chill he is getting warm and suffering from heat he is sometimes cooled, seeking, I suspect to have one and get rid of the other—the name in general use for this mixed state is "bittersweet"⁹⁵—it is stubbornly resistant to relief, and causes subsequently a savage irritation and tension.

D

PROTARCHUS: What is now being said is very true.

SOCRATES: Aren't some mixtures of this kind of equal portions of

95. Sappho frag. 130,2 calls Eros "sweet-bitter" (*glukupikros*), but the adjective Socrates implies, "bittersweet" (*pikroglukus*), is not extant.

pains and pleasures, and some have more of one kind than the other?

PROTARCHUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: Then say of some, whenever pains prove to be more than the pleasures—they are the pains of itching we just now spoke of and the pains that tingle and throb—whenever in the parts within there is a seething and an inflammation, and one does not get at it by rubbing and scraping, but one manages only to spread it on the surface, and by exposing them at times to fire and its contrary, and, in one's utter bewilderment, as they constantly alter one's condition, they supply at times indescribable pleasures, and, at times, when the things on the outside are in a contrary relation to the parts within, say that pains are in a blend⁹⁶ with pleasures in such a way that in whichever direction they incline—by the violent dissolution of conjoined things or the melting together of separated things—they set pains side by side with pleasures.⁹⁷

E

47A

PROTARCHUS: Most true.

SOCRATES: And whenever, in turn, more pleasure is mixed together throughout all parts of this kind, the surreptitious mixture of pain tickles and makes one slightly⁹⁸ irritated, while the far more extensive flooding in of pleasure tenses one up and on occasion makes one jump, and in producing all sorts of colors, all sorts of expressions, and all sorts of sighs, works in, with thoughtlessness, utter dismay and spells of shouting.

PROTARCHUS: Yes indeed.

B

SOCRATES: And the delight in these pleasures, my comrade, makes one exclaim about oneself, "I am dying"; and it no less makes another say the same about him.⁹⁹ And to the degree that one is in

96. "Blend" (*kerannumi*) first occurs here; it is different from "mix" (*meignumi*) inasmuch as "blend" is primarily used of a stable mixture, particularly of water and wine, while "mix" is used of any *mélange*, even of combat and sexual intercourse. "Blend" is most frequent from 61C on.

97. The text of this passage is not entirely certain, and, although the sense in general is clear, one cannot be confident that the details are exactly right. For the account, compare Socrates' description of the soul's growth of wings in the *Phaedrus* 251C: "The soul as a whole seethes at this time and throbs violently, and it's like the experience of teething when the teeth are just beginning to grow, there's an irritation and distress around the gums; it's the same thing that the soul of one beginning to sprout wings has experienced: it seethes and is vexed and tingles while growing its wings."

98. This is the fourth and last occurrence of *ērema*, which Socrates had originally introduced as the counterpart to *sphodra*.

99. Compare Philetaerus frag. 7 (Kock): "It's most pleasant to die while making love, as they say Phormisius died."

fact more out of control and more thoughtless, one is absolutely always going after them, calls them the greatest pleasures, and counts the one who is always living in them the most he can the happiest.

PROTARCHUS: From the point of view of the many, Socrates, you drew all the consequences right to the end [limit].

- C SOCRATES: Yes, Protarchus, but merely to the extent that I dealt with the pleasures in the common experiences of the body itself—when there is a blending of surface and internal experiences—but as for those in which soul contributes things contrary to body—pain set simultaneously against pleasure and pleasure against pain—so as for both to come together into a single blend, although we did speak previously of those cases when one is empty and desires filling, and in hoping one rejoices, although in being empty one feels pain, still we did not at that time bear witness to this point, but we say it now: “When soul is at odds with body on all these indescribably many occasions, a single mixture of pain and pleasure occurs coincidentally.”
- D

PROTARCHUS: You’re probably speaking most rightly.

SOCRATES: Well, then, we still have one of the mixtures of pain and pleasure left.

PROTARCHUS: Which one, do you say?

SOCRATES: We’re speaking of that joint blending that the soul by itself often takes with itself.

PROTARCHUS: How exactly are we speaking of this very point?

- E SOCRATES: Anger, fear, longing, dirge,¹⁰⁰ eros, emulation, envy [jealousy],¹⁰¹ and everything of the kind—don’t you actually set them down as certain pains of the soul by itself?

PROTARCHUS: Yes, I do.

100. “Dirge” (*thrēnos*) is an odd word to find in this context since it is not grief but the musical expression of grief. Grief shorn of song would perhaps be *penθος*, but *penθος* is almost exclusively the conventional expression of grief, and it is so far from conveying anything about the soul of the mourner that Herodotus can have Croesus “sit in great mourning” (*en penthei megalōi katēsto*) for two years (1.46.1) without his ever reflecting on his unhappiness (cf. 1.86). In the *Laws* 700B, the Athenian Stranger characterizes *thrēnos* as a species of song contrary to hymns or prayers to the gods.

101. In chapters 10 and 11 of the second book of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* (1387b22–1388b28), fine distinctions are drawn between envy (*phthonos*) and emulation (*zēlos*), the chief of which is that the emulous are distressed at the fact that the good fortune of another is not theirs and the envious that the good fortune of another is another’s. It should be said, however, that the distinction is not maintained in early literature, and later *zēlotupia* is sexual jealousy (cf. *Symposium* 213D, where Socrates uses both *zēlotupōn* and *phthonōn* to describe Alcibiades’ erotic relation to him).

SOCRATES: Isn't it the case that we'll find them full of indescribable pleasures? Or do we have to recall,

"which sets even the very wise to anger,
And is far sweeter than dripping honey,"

48A

and the pleasures mixed with pains in dirges and longings?¹⁰²

PROTARCHUS: No, but these when they occur would turn out in this way and not otherwise.

SOCRATES: And you remember as well tragic spectacles, when people weep at the same time as they are rejoicing?

PROTARCHUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And do you actually know the disposition of our soul in comedies, that there is also in them a mixture of pain and pleasure?

PROTARCHUS: No, I scarcely conceive how.

SOCRATES: The reason is, Protarchus, that it's absolutely not easy to understand that on each occasion there is in it an experience of this kind.

B

PROTARCHUS: It looks to me at any rate that it's not [easy].

SOCRATES: Then let's take it up all the more, to the degree that it is more obscure, in order that one may be able to understand more easily the mixture of pain and pleasure in other cases too.

PROTARCHUS: You must speak.

SOCRATES: There is, you know, the name "envy"—it was just now mentioned—will you set it down as some pain of soul, or how?

PROTARCHUS: In that way.

SOCRATES: But still the envious will come to light as taking pleasure in the evils of his neighbors.

PROTARCHUS: Yes, exactly.

C

SOCRATES: Ignorance,¹⁰³ furthermore, is bad, and the condition we speak of as fatuousness.

PROTARCHUS: Why of course.

SOCRATES: Now on this basis look at the laughable and see what nature it has.

PROTARCHUS: Just speak.

SOCRATES: Although there is a condition that in general is called

102. The quotation is from Achilles' speech to his mother, Thetis, in *Iliad* 18.108–

109. The manuscripts interpolate the phrase "in fits of anger and rage" in the first line of the quotation from Homer.

103. Both here and later, the manuscripts have not "ignorance" (*agnoia*) but "folly" (*anoia*), which although it fits better with "fatuousness," does not lead as naturally to Socrates' speaking of the self-ignorant as *hoi agnoountes hautous*.

"wickedness," there also belongs to wickedness in its entirety an experience that is the contrary of the one spoken by the letters in Delphi.

PROTARCHUS: Do you mean, Socrates, "Know thyself"?

D SOCRATES: Yes, I do. Now it's clear that its contrary, should it be spoken of in writing, would be, "Do not know thyself in any way."

PROTARCHUS: Why of course.

SOCRATES: Try, Protarchus, to cut this very thing in three.

PROTARCHUS: How do you mean? I won't be able.

SOCRATES: Are you saying that I must now divide it?

PROTARCHUS: I am saying it, and besides saying it I'm begging you.

SOCRATES: Isn't it a necessity, in the case of those who do not know themselves, for them severally to experience this kind of experience in one of three ways?

PROTARCHUS: How?

E SOCRATES: First of all, in point of money, to opine that they're richer than they are in terms of their own substance.¹⁰⁴

PROTARCHUS: There are, at any rate, many who have this kind of experience.

SOCRATES: But there are still more who opine they're taller and more beautiful, and in all aspects of the body they believe they are superior to what they are in truth.

PROTARCHUS: Sure.

SOCRATES: But by far the most, I suspect, are in error in regard to the third species of the experiences in souls: they opine they're better in point of virtue, although they are not.

PROTARCHUS: Yes, exactly.

49A SOCRATES: And in the case of the virtues, don't the majority, although they're full of contentiousness and false seeming-wisdom, actually put in a claim for wisdom and cling to it regardless?

PROTARCHUS: Sure they do.

SOCRATES: Although one would be right to say that every experience of the kind is bad—

PROTARCHUS: Exactly.

SOCRATES: Still, one must make a further distinction, Protarchus, and divide it in two, if, once we see the envy of boyish fun,¹⁰⁵ we are to go on to see a strange mixture of pleasure and pain.

104. The word for "wealth" (*ousia*) is also the word for "being."

105. "The envy of boyish fun" is *paidikos phthonos*. The adjective *paidikos* could be translated equally well by "boyish" and by "playful"; the "playfulness" of envy refers to the form it takes in Aristophanic comedy, in which there is no doubt also something characteristic of boys (cf. *Laws* 658d2).

PROTARCHUS: How do you mean it, that we are to cut it in two?¹⁰⁶

SOCRATES: Just as in the case of all human beings, isn't it most necessarily the case for all those who thoughtlessly opine this kind of false opinion about themselves that strength and power go along with some of them, and with some, I suspect, the contrary? B

PROTARCHUS: It's a necessity.

SOCRATES: Well, then, divide it by this, and if you assert that all of them who are of this kind but with weakness, and, if they are laughed at, are incapable of taking revenge, are the laughable and ridiculous, you'll be uttering the truth; but if you speak of those who are capable of taking revenge and are strong as frightening and hateful, you'll be rendering to yourself a most correct account of them. Ignorance, if it belongs to the strong, is hateful and ugly [shameful]—for it is no less in itself than in all its images harmful even to their neighbors—but, in our eyes, weak ignorance has taken as its lot the order and nature of the ridiculous. C

PROTARCHUS: What you say is most right, but still the mixture of pleasures and pains in them is not yet evident to me.

SOCRATES: Well, then, first take the power [meaning] of envy.

PROTARCHUS: Just speak.

SOCRATES: Surely it's some unjust pain and pleasure. D

PROTARCHUS: Well, that's a necessity.

SOCRATES: Although to rejoice at the evils of one's enemies is neither unjust nor subject to envy—¹⁰⁷

PROTARCHUS: Why of course.

SOCRATES: Still, isn't it actually unjust to see on occasion the evils of one's friends and not be in pain but to rejoice?

PROTARCHUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: Didn't we say of ignorance that it's bad for everyone?

PROTARCHUS: Rightly.

SOCRATES: Then in saying that it occurs in three species—the seeming-wisdom of one's friends, the seeming-beauty, and everything we just now went through—and all of them are ridiculous if they are weak, and all of them hateful if they are strong, are we to assert or are we not to assert that this condition, whenever any one of one's friends has it, which is harmless to everyone else, is, as I said just now, ridiculous? E

PROTARCHUS: Sure.

106. According to Burnet, manuscript T assigns this line to Socrates and makes his speech continuous from 49a7 to 49b4. But Diès says that all three manuscripts (BTW) give it to Protarchus.

107. Compare *Odyssey* 22.411–412 (Odysseus to Euryycleia): "Rejoice in your heart, old woman, be still and don't chortle in triumph; it is not holy to boast over slain men."

SOCRATES: And don't we agree that ignorance, in just being itself, is bad?

PROTARCHUS: Yes, exactly.

SOCRATES: And do we rejoice, or are we in pain, whenever we laugh at it?

50A PROTARCHUS: Clearly we rejoice.

SOCRATES: Weren't we saying that envy, which is producing this, is a pleasure at the evils of one's friends?

PROTARCHUS: It's a necessity.

SOCRATES: So the account asserts that, in our laughing at the absurdities of our friends, in blending pleasure with envy, we are blending together pleasure with pain; for we had agreed some time ago that envy was a pain of soul, but laughing was a pleasure, and the pair of them occurred simultaneously in these times.

PROTARCHUS: True.

B SOCRATES: So the account now reveals to us that in dirges and in tragedies,¹⁰⁸ not only in dramas but also in the entire tragedy and comedy of life¹⁰⁹ (as well as in thousands of different things), pains are blended together with pleasures.

PROTARCHUS: It's impossible not to agree with this, Socrates, even if one should be very contentious and strive for the victory of the contrary.

C SOCRATES: We had proposed, moreover, anger, longing, dirge, fear, eros, emulation, envy, and everything of the kind as those experiences in which we said we would find the elements we often spoke of in a mixed states. Isn't that so?

PROTARCHUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: Do we understand, then, that it's only about dirge, envy, and anger that everything was now gone through right to the end [limit]?

108. Hermann added "and comedies," and most editors follow him. But the fact that at *Republic* 394b5 there is only "tragedies"—although Herwerden proposed, not unreasonably, to add "comedies" and not all editors follow him—makes one hesitate to add it here, especially since "dirges" could, in light of Socrates' interpretation of comedy, stand for "comedies" as well as for more ordinary songs of pain.

109. This is the first known instance of such an expression, whereby tragedy and comedy characterize life itself. Such a privilege was never extended, as far as I know, to any other poetic form. In Plato's *Laws*, this peculiarity is alluded to in the following way. The Athenian Stranger has asked who would win first prize were there a contest in which every kind of showman were allowed to compete; and he suggests that the puppeteer would win among the small children, and the producer of comedies among young men, but that the majority would favor tragedy; he does not say the maker or producer of tragedy (658A–D). Likewise, in the *Laches* (183a2–b2), Laches' curious proportion implies that what the Athenians preeminently favor is to live tragedy.

PROTARCHUS: Of course we understand.

SOCRATES: Are the remainder still many?

PROTARCHUS: For sure.

SOCRATES: Why exactly do you suppose I particularly showed you the mixture in comedy? Wasn't it actually for the sake of an assurance that it's easy to display the blending in fears and loves,¹¹⁰ at least, and all the rest; and once you took it and had it, you were to let me go, so I didn't have to lengthen out my speeches by going on to them, but you were to take it generally that body without soul, soul without body, as well as both in common with one another, are in their experiences full of pleasure in a blend with pains? Now speak. Are you letting me go, or will you keep me up to midnight? But, I suspect, if I just make a small remark, I'll succeed in winning from you my release: I'll be willing to render you an account of all of them tomorrow, but at the moment, in light of the judgment that Philebus enjoins, I want to set out for the remainder.

D

E

PROTARCHUS: Thank you, Socrates, you put it beautifully, and please go through all the rest for us in whatever way it's to your liking [dear to you].

SOCRATES: Well, then, naturally after the mixed pleasures, we must—whatever the agent of compulsion may be—proceed in turn to the unmixed.

PROTARCHUS: You put it most beautifully.

51A

SOCRATES: Then I shall try, in changing course, to indicate them to you. For some reason or other they hardly persuade me—those who say that all the pleasures are a cessation of pains—but I use them as witnesses, as I said, against some experiences that are thought to be pleasures but in no way are, as well as against the apparitions of some other great and extensive pleasures, but that are in fact pleasures that have been worked together into a dough with pains and are respites from the greatest distresses, involving, as they do, perplexities of soul and body.

PROTARCHUS: But which ones, Socrates, should one suppose them true, would one think rightly about?

B

SOCRATES: The pleasures of so-called beautiful colors, figures, most of the smells, and sounds, everything, in short, that with imperceptible needs transmits the perceived pleasures of painless fulfillments.

PROTARCHUS: How exactly are we to speak of them, Socrates?

110. Compare Euripides *Hippolytus* 347–349: “Phaedra: What is this exactly that men call to love? Nurse: The same thing, my girl, is pleasantest and painful together. Phaedra: Then I must have experienced only one of the two.”

- C SOCRATES: Well, as it's not immediately clear what I'm saying, I certainly must try to make it clear. What I'm now trying to say about the beauty of figures is not, as the many would suppose it to be, the beauty either of animals or of certain paintings, but, the argument asserts, I mean something straight, and something round, and, if you understand no doubt, the surfaces and solids made from them by lathes, straightedges, and squares. I'm saying that these things are not, as others are, beautiful by a relation to something, but they are by nature beautiful in themselves and admit some pleasures peculiar to themselves, which in no way resemble the pleasures of scratchings. And there are besides colors of this type. Well, do we actually understand this, or how?

D PROTARCHUS: I am trying, Socrates, but you too try once and for all to speak still more plainly.

SOCRATES: I'm speaking of smooth and brilliant sounds, which send forth a single pure song: they are not beautiful relative to another, but they, and the innate pleasures that go along with them, are beautiful in and of themselves.

PROTARCHUS: This too is so.

- E SOCRATES: But as for smells, although it is a less divine genus of pleasures than the former, still, the fact that necessary pains are not in a state of mix with them, however this occurs and in whatever it in fact occurs, I'm setting all of it down as the counterpart to them.¹¹¹ Well, if you understand, these are two species of the kinds of pleasures we're speaking of.

PROTARCHUS: I understand.

- 52A SOCRATES: Well, then, let's still add to them the pleasures of learnings, if after all they seem to us to admit no pangs of hunger for learning them, any more than that sufferings arise from the start on account of the hunger of learning.¹¹²

PROTARCHUS: Well, I share this opinion.

SOCRATES: And what of this? Do you catch sight of any pains in their

111. "Them" refers to all the pleasures of the senses previously discussed that do not involve pain. Compare *Timaeus* 66d1-8: "In regard to the capacity of the nostrils, there are no species in them. What characterizes smells as a whole is their being semigeneric, for in taking in any smell a commensuration with no species results. Our olfactory nerves were put together too narrowly for the genera of earth and water, and too broadly for those of fire and air, and therefore no one ever senses a smell of any of them, but smells occur when the elements are either being moistened, rotting, melting, or becoming smoke." In terms of the *Philebus*, *Timaeus* implies that the pure pleasure of certain odors is based on the unlimited and the more and less.

112. "Hunger" and "thirst for knowledge," although very common expressions in English, are very rare in either Greek or Latin (cf. Aristotle *de caelo* 291a27).

loss, if those with their fill of learnings undergo subsequent losses through forgetfulness?

PROTARCHUS: Not at all by nature at least, but in some calculations of the experience, whenever someone, in his deprivation, is in pain on account of need. B

SOCRATES: And yet, you blessed innocent, it's only for the experiences of nature apart from calculation that, at least at the moment, we're proceeding in our review right through to the end [limit].

PROTARCHUS: Well, then, what you say is true, and, in the case of learnings, a forgetfulness apart from pain occurs for us on each occasion.¹¹³

SOCRATES: Well, then, we must state that these pleasures of learnings are unmixed with pains and belong to extremely few human beings and not in any way to the many.

PROTARCHUS: Of course, we must state it.

SOCRATES: Now that we have discriminated between and separated out in a measured way the pure pleasures and those that would be rightly spoken of as pretty nearly impure, aren't we to add in speech "unmeasuredness" to the extreme pleasures and, on the contrary, "measuredness" to those that are not? And are we, in turn, to set down the pleasures that receive the big and the extreme, regardless of whether they occur often or seldom, as belonging to the nature of that unlimited of ours and the genus of the less and more that travels through body and soul,¹¹⁴ and those pleasures that are not in that genus as belonging to the measured kind? C

PROTARCHUS: You are speaking most rightly, Socrates. D

SOCRATES: Well, then, after this, we must still go on to observe this additional aspect of them.

PROTARCHUS: What?

SOCRATES: Whatever must we say of them in point of truth? [I mean] the pure and uncontaminated or the extreme, the vast, the big, and the adequate?¹¹⁵

113. Wittingly or not, Protarchus alludes to the opposition between "true" (*alēthē*) and "forgetfulness" (*lēthē*) (cf. Plutarch frags. 215 g and i [Sandbach]).

114. This is the last mention of the *apeiron* in the dialogue as well as of the more and less, but this is the only time the expression "more and less" has been inverted (cf. 55D). In the dialogue, the unlimited and the more and less are replaced by becoming in its opposition to being (cf. 53C).

115. In the manuscripts, "the adequate" is after "the big," but Jackson and Bury suggested that it be placed with "the pure and uncontaminated" so that there would be three adjectives on either side. It seems clear, however, from 62A–B that "the adequate" cannot belong with "the pure" in point of truth.

PROTARCHUS: What in the world do you actually mean by your question?

- E SOCRATES: I want, Protarchus, to leave nothing out in my testing of pleasure and knowledge, if it turns out that one part of each of them is pure, and the other not pure, in order that each in its purity may proceed to the judgment¹¹⁶ and make the possibility of a decision for me, for you, and for all those who are here.

PROTARCHUS: Most right.

SOCRATES: Come then, in all the cases in which we speak of pure genera, let's think it through in just this way. First, let's choose some one of them and go on to examine it.

- 53A PROTARCHUS: What, then, are we to choose?

SOCRATES: Let's first take a look, if you want, at white as a genus.

PROTARCHUS: Yes, of course, let's.

SOCRATES: What kind of purity of which would we have, and how? Is it the greatest and most extensive, or the most unblended, in whichever one there is no share of any other color?¹¹⁷

PROTARCHUS: Clearly the most untainted as possible.

- B SOCRATES: Right. Is this, then, actually the truest, Protarchus? And are we at the same instant to set down the purest, and not the most extensive any more than the greatest, as the most beautiful of all whites?

PROTARCHUS: Yes, most right.

SOCRATES: So if we say that a small, pure white proves to be at the same time whiter, more beautiful, and truer than an overwhelming mass of a mixed white, we shall be speaking absolutely rightly.

PROTARCHUS: Yes, most rightly.

SOCRATES: What then? We surely won't need many paradigms of the kind for the argument about pleasure, but it's enough for us to conceive on the spot that, after all, every small and slight pleasure, if it's cleansed of pain, would prove to be more pleasant, truer, and more beautiful than a great and extensive pleasure.¹¹⁸

C

PROTARCHUS: Yes, exactly, and the example is enough.

SOCRATES: What about the following kind of thing? Haven't we actually heard this about pleasure, "It is always a becoming, but there is altogether no being (*ousia*) of pleasure?" There are certain clever

116. Badham suggested *krasin* (blending) for *krisin* (judgment) (cf. n. 125 below).

117. This is Badham's correction; the manuscripts read "in whichever one there is no other share of any color."

118. Socrates omits "mixed" with "great and extensive." Either it is to be understood on the basis of the parallel with adulterated white, or "great and extensive" entails by itself that the pleasure is mixed with pain.

people who try to lay before us the evidence for this speech, and to them in turn we have to be grateful.

PROTARCHUS: Why is that?

SOCRATES: Merely by putting the point at issue in a question, my dear Protarchus, I'll go through it to the end [limit] for you.¹¹⁹

D

PROTARCHUS: Just speak and ask.

SOCRATES: Is there a pair of things, one that is just itself by itself, and one always desiring something else?

PROTARCHUS: What pair is this, and how do you mean it?

SOCRATES: One is that which is forever most august by nature,¹²⁰ and one falls short of it.

PROTARCHUS: Speak still more plainly.

SOCRATES: Surely we have observed a beautiful and good beloved and along with him his manly lovers?¹²¹

PROTARCHUS: Yes, exactly.

SOCRATES: Well, then, seek two different things with a likeness to this existing pair that holds throughout everything we speak of as being.

E

PROTARCHUS: Shall I say it a third time? Speak more plainly, Socrates, what you mean.

SOCRATES: It's not at all complicated, Protarchus, but the argument is teasing the pair of us, and it says, "One is always for the sake of one of the beings, and one is that for the sake of which whatever becomes for the sake of something always becomes on each occasion."

PROTARCHUS: Although it's with difficulty, still, because it's been said so often, I understand.

SOCRATES: But soon perhaps we'll understand better, my boy, when the argument has gone forward.

54A

PROTARCHUS: Sure, why not?

SOCRATES: Let's take these two other things.

PROTARCHUS: Which?

119. This is the last time the verb *perainein* (derived from *peras*, "limit") appears; it occurred seven times before (11C, 12B, 20C, 33A, 47B, 50C, 52B). In all cases, the verb is applied solely to an argument, never to things; this restriction is generally true throughout Plato, but not always (cf. *Meno* 76A and *Timaeus* 39D).

120. "August" (*semnon*) is applied to intelligible being that lacks life and mind at *Sophist* 249A.

121. "Beloved" in Greek (*ta paidika*) is a neuter plural substantive that, taken literally, would mean "the things of the boy," but the expression is on occasion used of girls as well, and, although it most often designates an individual beloved, it can also be a plural. In Socrates' example, it can be taken as either a singular or a plural, but only, I think, of a homosexual relation.

SOCRATES: Of all things, genesis is some one thing, and being another one.

PROTARCHUS: I accept from you these two, being and genesis.

SOCRATES: Most right. Which of them is for the sake of which? Are we to say that genesis is for the sake of being, or being for the sake of genesis?

PROTARCHUS: Are you asking now whether that which is addressed as being, which is just what it is, is for the sake of genesis?

SOCRATES: Apparently I am.

B PROTARCHUS: By the gods! Are you actually asking me something like this? "Tell me, Protarchus, do you assert that shipbuilding comes to be for the sake of ships rather than ships for the sake of shipbuilding, and everything of the kind?"¹²²

SOCRATES: That's what I mean, Protarchus.

PROTARCHUS: Then why don't you give the answer yourself, Socrates?

SOCRATES: There's no reason why I don't, but you yourself take part in the argument.

PROTARCHUS: Yes, of course.

C SOCRATES: Then I assert that, whereas drugs, every kind of instrument, and every kind of stuff are served up for everything for the sake of genesis, each different kind of genesis comes to be for the sake of some different individual being, and the entirety of genesis comes to be for the sake of the entirety of being.

PROTARCHUS: Yes, most plainly.

SOCRATES: Isn't it the case, then, that pleasure, provided it is a genesis, must of necessity become for the sake of some being?

PROTARCHUS: Why of course.

SOCRATES: And, further, that for the sake of which whatever is becoming for the sake of something would always be becoming in the lot and portion of the good; but that which is becoming for the sake of something, my excellent fellow,¹²³ must be set into a different lot and portion.

122. From "something like this?" to the end of the next question, the manuscripts give it to Socrates, but, by the small correction of "I say, Protarchus" (*legō, ō Protarkhe*) to "Say, Protarchus" (*leg, ō Protarkhe*), Badham assigned it to Protarchus. Aristotle alludes to this at *EN* 1152b12–15: "Now in general pleasure is thought to be not good, because every pleasure is a perceptible genesis to nature, and no genesis is akin to the ends, for example, no housebuilding to a house."

123. "Excellent fellow" is *ariste*, the vocative of the superlative of "good." This address occurs right after Socrates has tried to get Protarchus to answer the question about the good, which, Protarchus believes, Socrates could just as easily answer. For whom,

PROTARCHUS: Most necessarily.

SOCRATES: So we shall actually be setting pleasure rightly, provided it is a genesis, if we set it into some different lot and portion than that of the good? D

PROTARCHUS: Yes, yes, most rightly.

SOCRATES: Then we must be grateful, as I said at the beginning of the argument, to the one who laid information about pleasure, that it is a genesis, and there is not any being whatsoever to it; for it's obvious that he is laughing at those who assert that pleasure is good.

PROTARCHUS: Yes, exactly.

SOCRATES: And this same fellow will laugh on each occasion as well as those people who gain their completion and end in becomings. E

PROTARCHUS: How do you mean that, and at what kind of people?

SOCRATES: At all those who in healing either hunger or thirst or anything of the kind—everything that becoming heals—rejoice on account of the becoming, inasmuch as it itself is a pleasure, and say they wouldn't choose to live unless they were to be in states of thirst and hunger and experience everything else one could speak of as going along with experiences of this kind.

PROTARCHUS: It seems, at any rate, as if they do. 55A

SOCRATES: Wouldn't we all assert that to be corrupted is the contrary of to become?

PROTARCHUS: Necessarily.

SOCRATES: One would, then, in choosing this, be choosing corruption and becoming, but not that third kind of life, in which there was neither joy nor pain, but thoughtful thinking as pure as possible.

PROTARCHUS: If one sets down pleasure as good for us, Socrates, the result proves to be, it seems, of an overwhelming irrationality.

SOCRATES: Overwhelming, particularly if we go on to speak of it in the following way.

PROTARCHUS: In what way?

SOCRATES: How isn't it irrational that there is nothing good or beautiful either in bodies or in many other things except in soul, and there only pleasure is good, but manliness, moderation, mind, or anything else that soul has allotted to it as good, is not of this kind? And besides, whoever does not rejoice but is suffering, how isn't it B

then, is the good of the dialogue? Is Protarchus that august being of which Socrates falls short?

- irrational to be compelled to say he is bad whenever he's suffering, even if he's the best of all, and whoever is enjoying, to the degree that he enjoys more, then when he is enjoying, by that degree he is outstanding in point of virtue?¹²⁴
- C

PROTARCHUS: All of this, Socrates, is as irrational as it possibly can be.

SOCRATES: Well, then, let's not attempt in any case to make a complete examination of pleasure, and evidently be extremely sparing as it were of mind and knowledge; but in a generous and noble way, let's ring them on the counter and test them all around, whether at any point they have something rotten, so that, once we've caught sight of whatever is the purest of them by nature, we may use their truest parts (as well as pleasure's) for the common judgment.¹²⁵

PROTARCHUS: Right.

- D
- SOCRATES: I believe it's the case that for us one part of the science of learnings is the demiurgic, and one is concerned with education and upbringing.¹²⁶ Or how?

PROTARCHUS: That's so.

SOCRATES: Then let's first think through the case of the handicrafts, whether one part of them is dependent on science to a greater degree, and the other is less, and we must hold the former as the purest, and the latter as more impure.

PROTARCHUS: We must.

124. Compare *Gorgias* 498D–E for a similar argument: "Socrates: Don't you know that you're asserting that the good are good by the presence of goods, and bad [by the presence] of bad things? And that pleasures are the goods, and the pains are bad? Callicles: Yes, I do. Socrates: Isn't it the case, then, that for those who enjoy, the goods—the pleasures—are present, if they enjoy? Callicles: Of course. Socrates: Isn't it the case, then, when goods are present, those who enjoy are good? Callicles: Yes. Socrates: What of this? Aren't the bad things—pains—present to those in pain? Callicles: They are present. Socrates: But you're asserting that the bad are bad by the presence of bad things? Or are you no longer asserting it? Callicles: Yes, I am. Socrates: Then whoever enjoy are good, and whoever are in pain are bad? Callicles: For sure. Socrates: And just as whoever [enjoy or are in pain] to a greater degree are [better or worse], and whoever [experience] less are less [good or bad], and whoever [experience] to a similar degree are to a similar degree [good and bad]? Callicles: Yes. Socrates: Aren't you asserting that the thoughtful and the thoughtless, the cowards and the manly, enjoy and are in pain to a similar degree, or to a still greater degree the cowards? Callicles: Yes, I am."

125. Schleiermacher suggested *krasin* (blending) for *krisin* (judgment).

126. Socrates seems to be using *mathēmata* (learnings) in the restricted sense of "mathematics," since every science is by definition of *mathēmata* in the broad sense of "learnings," and thus to be denying any kind of precise knowledge to education and upbringing.

SOCRATES: Well, then, must we pull apart and keep separate the leading arts of each?

PROTARCHUS: Which ones and how?

SOCRATES: If, for example, one separates out from all the arts the arts of number, measurement, and weighing, the remainder in each art would be virtually worthless. E

PROTARCHUS: Really worthless.

SOCRATES: What would be left, at any rate, after this separation, would be conjecture and the exercise of the senses by experience and a kind of knack, using the powers of guesswork—many call them arts—but their strength has been produced by practice and toil.¹²⁷ 56A

PROTARCHUS: What you say is most necessary.

SOCRATES: Doubtless it's primarily flute playing that is full of it, as it is not by measure but by the guesswork of practice that it fits and adjusts the consonant, and all of music [is full of] it too,¹²⁸ which hunts down by guesswork the measure of each string as it travels, so as for the unclear element to be extensively mixed in it, and the steady and firm part to be small.

PROTARCHUS: Most true.

SOCRATES: And we shall find furthermore that medicine, farming, piloting, and generalship are arts in the same condition. B

PROTARCHUS: For sure.

SOCRATES: But, I suspect, the things that supply to carpentry an extensive precision—it uses the largest number of measures and instruments—render it more artful than many sciences.

PROTARCHUS: In what respect?

SOCRATES: Throughout shipbuilding, housebuilding, and in many other parts of woodworking, there is the use, I suspect, of straight-edge, lathe, compass, ruddled line, and a certain ingeniously contrived caliper.¹²⁹ C

PROTARCHUS: For sure, Socrates, what you say is right.

SOCRATES: Well, then, let's set down the so-called arts in two: some

127. In the *Gorgias* (463A), this is practically Socrates' initial characterization of rhetoric: "It seems to me, Gorgias, that it's not an artful practice and pursuit, but characteristic of a manly soul good at guesswork and naturally adept at associating with human beings; and I call the chief part of it flattery."

128. This is Bury's rearrangement; the manuscripts have "flute playing" where "music" is, and vice versa. Post reads "harmonics" (*harmonikē*) for *aulētikē*, "flute playing," and keeps the order of the manuscripts.

129. "Caliper" is a mere guess for *prosagōgion*, but the Suda's definition, "an instrument for straightening wood," cannot be right.

go along with music and partake of less precision in their works, and some go along with carpentry and partake of more.

PROTARCHUS: It's been done.

SOCRATES: And of the latter those we just now spoke of as primary are the most precise.

PROTARCHUS: You appear to mean arithmetic and all those you just now spoke of with it.

D SOCRATES: Yes, of course. But, Protarchus, mustn't we actually speak also of these as in turn double? Or how?

PROTARCHUS: Which ones exactly do you mean?

SOCRATES: Mustn't we actually first speak of the arithmetic of the many as different, and the arithmetic of the philosophers in turn as different?

PROTARCHUS: By what kind of distinction would one set down one arithmetic as different and another as something else?

E SOCRATES: It's not a small distinction, Protarchus. Some of those involved in number surely count unequal monads, for example, two armies, two oxen, two of the smallest, or perhaps two of the largest of all things; but some would never go along with them, unless one will set down in the case of each and every monad out of ten thousand that not one is different from any other.

PROTARCHUS: Your point is very well taken. For those who deal with number the difference is not small, so it makes sense for the monads to be two.

57A SOCRATES: And what of this? The arts of calculation and measurement—those that match up with carpentry and the art of the merchant—are they different from the geometry and calculations practiced philosophically, and must we speak of each of them as one, or are we to set them down as two?

PROTARCHUS: Were I to go along with the previous difference, I would cast my vote for each of them to be two.

SOCRATES: Right. Do you actually have in mind the purpose of our bringing these things out in the middle?

PROTARCHUS: Perhaps, but I would prefer it if you would answer the present question openly.

B SOCRATES: Well, then, it seems to me that this argument, no less than when we were beginning to speak it, in seeking in the sciences for a counterpart to the pleasures, has set the problem for examination here: "Is some knowledge actually purer than another knowledge, just as pleasure was than pleasure?"

PROTARCHUS: This at least is very plain, that the argument has put its hand to this for that reason.

SOCRATES: What then? Although in the previous arguments it had actually found that different arts range over different things, and they differ in point of greater or less clarity from each other—

PROTARCHUS: Yes, of course.

SOCRATES: Still, did not the argument actually speak in their case of a certain art as homonymous, and present it to opinion as if it were one, and then once more, as if the pair were two, went on to ask about their clarity and purity, whether the art of the philosophers or of the nonphilosophers admits of the greater precision?¹³⁰

C

PROTARCHUS: It seems to me that it went into this question very thoroughly.

SOCRATES: What answer, then, do we give it, Protarchus?

PROTARCHUS: In point of clarity of the sciences, Socrates, we have advanced to an amazing magnitude of difference.

SOCRATES: Then we'll answer all the more easily?

PROTARCHUS: Why of course. Let the statement run: "These differ from all the other arts by a lot, and, of them, those that involve the impulse of the really and truly philosophic differ in an inconceivable way, in point of precision and truth, in regard to measures and numbers."

D

SOCRATES: Let it be so according to you, and with trust in you we shall answer with confidence those who are dreadfully clever in the tearing to pieces of arguments—

PROTARCHUS: What?

SOCRATES: "There are two arithmetics, two metrics, and many different arts of the same kind that go along with these, and all of them have this kind of duality, although they retain a partnership in a single name."

PROTARCHUS: Let's give them, Socrates, this answer—you say they're the dreadfully clever—and good luck to them.

E

SOCRATES: Are we then to say that these are the especially precise sciences?

PROTARCHUS: Yes, of course.

SOCRATES: Well, Protarchus, the power of conversing would repudiate us should we judge anything else before it.

PROTARCHUS: But what must we say it is?

SOCRATES: It's obvious. Everyone would know what is now being spoken of. Everyone, without exception, I suspect, to whom there

58A

130. Compare Aristotle *Posterior Analytics* 78b39–79a2: "Some of the sciences are pretty nearly synonymous, for example 'astronomy' is as much mathematical as navigational, and 'harmonics' as much mathematical as acoustic."

clings even a small bit of mind, believes the truest understanding by far concerns that which is, and the “really and truly,”¹³¹ and that which is by nature always in the same way. And what of you, Protarchus? How would you discriminate it?

B PROTARCHUS: Well, Socrates, I often used to hear from Gorgias time and time again that the knowledge of persuading differs from all arts by a lot—it enslaves everything to it, he said, but voluntarily and not by force, and it’s by far the best of all the arts¹³²—but I would not want to cross either you or him now.

SOCRATES: I think you wanted to say “cross swords” but were ashamed and left it in the lurch.¹³³

PROTARCHUS: Let it be for now in just the way you think.¹³⁴

SOCRATES: Could it actually be myself, then, who’s responsible for your not understanding me beautifully?

PROTARCHUS: About what?

C SOCRATES: I wasn’t searching for this yet, my dear Protarchus, what art or what science excels all others by being the greatest and the best and by benefiting us the most, but which one examines the plain, the precise, and the truest, even if it’s small and small are its benefits—this is exactly what we’re now seeking. Well, look, you won’t even incur the enmity of Gorgias, if you grant to his art a superiority in point of usefulness for human beings, but grant to the business I just now spoke of—and, just as I was then saying of
D white that, even if it’s small but pure, in this very point, by its being the most true, it surpasses the extensive and what is not of this

131. The phrase “the really and truly” all by itself has been doubted: either it has been deleted altogether, or “being” has been added to it (“that which really and truly is”). But it seems that Socrates is distinguishing between that which is, regardless of whether it is or is not an idea (e.g., the city or man), the experience of being, and being that is always.

132. Protarchus’s description of Gorgianic rhetoric is very close to what Polus and Gorgias say in the *Gorgias*. Polus speaks of rhetoric as the best and most beautiful of the arts (448c7–9), and Gorgias says that the rhetorician holds every other craftsman enslaved (452e5–8) and that rhetoric comprehends virtually all powers and holds them subordinate to itself (456a7).

133. The phrase *ti thesthai hopla*, to which Socrates alludes, could mean “to fight” (to hold one’s weapons at the ready), “to surrender” (to lay down one’s weapons), or “to be at ease” (with one’s arms nearby). “Left it in the lurch” is meant to convey the pun in *apolipein*, which could mean “deserted your post” as well as “left it out.”

134. It is remarkable that Socrates uses the verb *boulesthai* to express what he thinks was Protarchus’s wish and Protarchus uses *dokein* to express what he thinks is Socrates’ opinion, for in the *Gorgias* (467B ff.) Socrates makes an elaborate distinction between *boulesthai* and *dokein*, assigning to the former rational designs and to the latter random whims. The two verbs, then, reflect the difference between thought and pleasure.

kind, so now, after we have thought it through exactly¹³⁵ and worked out an adequate calculation, without a glance at either any benefits of sciences or any occasions of renown, but only whether there is by nature some power of our soul to love the true and do everything for its sake, let us state, after a thorough investigation, whether we would say it's likely to the highest degree that the pure part of mind and thought possesses this, or we have to seek for some other power more authoritative than it.

PROTARCHUS: Well, I'm considering, and it's difficult, I suspect, to concede that there's some different science or art that holds on to the truth more than it does. E

SOCRATES: Did you actually reflect, then in saying what you have now said, on the following, "Many arts, and all who have expended toil and effort in them, employ, in the first place, opinions and are seeking with a strained effort the things involved with opinion?" So even if he believes he is inquiring into nature, you know he is seeking all his life for that which concerns this cosmos, how it has come to be, how it is a patient, and how an agent.¹³⁶ Would we say this, or how? 59A

PROTARCHUS: Just so.

SOCRATES: Then any one of us who is like that has assumed the toil, not about the things that always are, but about the things that become, will become, and have become?

PROTARCHUS: Most true.

SOCRATES: Would we assert, then, that, in the case of these things, not one of which ever was, will be, or at the present moment is in the same state, any clarity of the most precise truth will occur? B

PROTARCHUS: How could it?

SOCRATES: Then how could we ever get anything solid whatsoever about things that do not possess any solidity whatsoever?

PROTARCHUS: In no way, I suspect.

SOCRATES: Any more than any mind or science about them has what is most true.

135. "Exactly" is *sphodra*, the sign of the more and less. There is no other passage in Plato where "thinking" (*dianoesthai*) and *sphodra* are combined (cf. *Theaetetus* 162d2–5), but the idiomatic *prosekhein* noun ("to pay attention," or, lit., "to apply mind") is combined with *sphodra* at 32E, and the combination occurs five times elsewhere in Plato.

136. In the *Sophist* (247E), the Eleatic Stranger proposes that being be defined as power, either as agent or as patient, and anything that can act on another or be acted on by another, even if it is very slight and only once, is. Being as power is an improvement on the position of those who say that to be is to be body, but it is rejected by "the friends of the species" (248C–E).

PROTARCHUS: It's not likely, at any rate.

SOCRATES: Then as for poor little you, me, Gorgias, and Philebus, we must say, "Good riddance!" and dismiss us all,¹³⁷ and, as witnesses to the argument, testify to the following—

C PROTARCHUS: To what?

SOCRATES: "We must speak either of the solid, the pure, the true, and what we speak of as the uncontaminated as concerned with those things that are always in the same state and likewise most unmixed, or of all that is to the highest degree akin to them; but everything else we must speak of as secondary and subsequent."

PROTARCHUS: What you say is most true.

SOCRATES: Then isn't it actually most just, in cases of this kind, to assign the most beautiful of names to the most beautiful things?

PROTARCHUS: It's likely at least.

D SOCRATES: Then aren't mind and thought exactly those names one would honor to the highest degree?

PROTARCHUS: Yes.

SOCRATES: And these names, in gaining their highest precision in their application to the thoughts and reflections on that which really and truly is, are set down rightly?

PROTARCHUS: Yes, of course.

SOCRATES: And yet it was no other names than these that I then offered to the judgment?

PROTARCHUS: Why of course, Socrates.

E SOCRATES: Very well then. Now, in regard to thought and pleasure, if one should say that, for the purpose of their mixing with one another, they are now set before us, as if we were craftsmen, as the things out of which or in which we must craft something, one would be making a beautiful likeness in speech.

PROTARCHUS: Very beautiful.

SOCRATES: Then mustn't we actually try to mix them next?

PROTARCHUS: Why of course.

SOCRATES: Wouldn't it be right rather than not to state this beforehand and remind ourselves of it?

PROTARCHUS: What's that?

60A SOCRATES: What we mentioned also before; but the proverb is thought to hold good: one ought to range back and forth again and

137. *Sukhna khairein ean* ("Good riddance!") is a variant of the common formula *polla khairein ean*, which literally means "to allow there to be much joy." But it is always an expression of contemptuous dismissal: the purity of the science of being has no room for human beings, to say nothing of the proposed mixture of thought and pleasure.

again in speech, at least over whatever is beautiful, twice and thrice.¹³⁸

PROTARCHUS: Why of course.

SOCRATES: Come then, by Zeus! I suspect that what was then said was stated as follows.

PROTARCHUS: How?

SOCRATES: Philebus says that pleasure has been the right aim for all animals, and everyone ought to aim at it, and, in general, this very thing is the good for all, and if the two words, "good" and "pleasant," are as a pair set down strictly, they are for some one thing and one nature; but Socrates says they are not one but two, just like their names, and the good and the pleasant have a nature different from one another, and thought is a participant in the lot and portion of the good to a higher degree than pleasure. Wasn't this what was stated then, Protarchus, and isn't it still?

PROTARCHUS: Exactly.¹³⁹

SOCRATES: And we would further agree both then and now on the following.

PROTARCHUS: What?

SOCRATES: That the nature of the good differs from everything else in this respect.

PROTARCHUS: In what?

SOCRATES: That to whatever animal it should be present in every way completely and without exception, it no longer stands in need of any other thing, and it has the adequate most perfectly. Isn't this so?

PROTARCHUS: Yes, that's so.

SOCRATES: Didn't we in speech put them to the test by the assignment of each of the two apart from the other into the life of everyone, with pleasure unmixed with thought, and likewise thought without even the smallest bit of pleasure?

PROTARCHUS: That was so.

SOCRATES: Did it then seem to us that either of them was adequate for anyone?

138. The proverb occurs elsewhere in Plato in the form of either "It is beautiful to speak and investigate the beautiful things twice and thrice" (*Gorgias* 498E), "The beautiful twice spoken does no harm" (*Laws* 754C), or "The right is beautiful twice and thrice" (*Laws* 956E). The scholium on the *Gorgias* passage says that it is taken from Empedocles fr. 25, "It is beautiful to say twice what one should." The expression "to range back and forth (*anapolein*) over words twice and thrice" occurs in Sophocles *Philoctetes* 1238.

139. This is the last occurrence of the adverb *sphodra*; altogether, it occurred twenty-eight times, the adjective *sphodros* eight.

PROTARCHUS: How could it?

SOCRATES: But if at that time we veered off course somewhat, let anyone whatsoever at this time resume the issue and speak more rightly. Let him set down memory, thought, knowledge, and true opinion as belonging to the same species (*idea*), and then have him consider whether anyone would choose for himself to have or get anything whatsoever without them, let alone pleasure, regardless of whether the pleasure were the most extensive or the most extreme possible, which he neither truly opines that he is enjoying nor altogether knows what experience he has undergone, and, in turn, has no memory of the experience for any length of time whatsoever. And let him say the same about thought, whether anyone would choose to have thought without any kind of pleasure—even the briefest—rather than with some pleasures, or to have all pleasures apart from thought rather than with some kind of thought.

E

PROTARCHUS: It is impossible, Socrates, and there's no need to repeatedly put this question at least.

61A SOCRATES: Isn't it the case, then, that neither of them would be the perfect, the choosable by all, and the absolutely good?

PROTARCHUS: How could they?

SOCRATES: Well, the good, then, must be grasped either with clarity and distinctness or else some type of it, in order that we may know, as we were saying, to which we are to give second prize.

PROTARCHUS: What you say is most right.

SOCRATES: Haven't we picked up on some way to the good?

PROTARCHUS: Which way?

B SOCRATES: It's like this: should someone, in seeking for some human being, first inquire about his dwelling place and rightly learn where he dwells, he would surely hold it to be a great thing for the finding of the one sought.¹⁴⁰

PROTARCHUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: So now too some argument revealed to us, just as at the beginning, not to seek the good in the unmixed life but in the mixed.

PROTARCHUS: Yes, sure.

140. For the notion of home, one might compare the end of the *Hippias Maior* (304d3–8), where Socrates, who has in the course of the dialogue split himself between a Socrates who can talk with Hippias and a Socrates with whom Hippias cannot talk, tells Hippias of the abuse that he will receive from the one who always refutes him: "He is in fact the nearest to me in race and dwells in the same place; so after I come home to my own house and he hears me saying these things, he asks me whether I am not ashamed to have the nerve to converse about beautiful practices, when it is so manifestly shown that about the beautiful I do not even know this, what in the world it is."

SOCRATES: Isn't there a greater hope that what is being sought will be more evident in whatever is beautifully mixed than in whatever is not?

PROTARCHUS: Yes, far more.

SOCRATES: Then while we are blending, Protarchus, let's pray to the gods, whether it's Dionysus, Hephaestus, or whatever god has this office of blending as his lot. C

PROTARCHUS: Yes, of course.

SOCRATES: And look! Right before us there are springs, just as if we are wine pourers—one might liken the spring of pleasure to honey, and the sobering and wineless spring of thought to a dry and healthful water—and we must be eager to mix them together as beautifully as possible.¹⁴¹

PROTARCHUS: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Come now, should we after all mix every kind of pleasure with every kind of thought, would we actually come the closest to whatever's beautifully mixed?¹⁴² D

PROTARCHUS: Perhaps.

SOCRATES: Well, it's not safe. I think I should declare my opinion how we would mix with less risk.

PROTARCHUS: Say what it is.

SOCRATES: We were agreed that just as one pleasure is, we suspect, a true pleasure to a higher degree than another,¹⁴³ so one art is more precise than another art.

PROTARCHUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: And science, moreover, was different from science, one looking away from everything else and toward the things that come into being and perish, and one to the things that neither come to be nor perish, but are always in the same way and the same state. And in considering them in light of the true, we thought the latter was truer than the former. E

PROTARCHUS: Yes, of course, and rightly so.

SOCRATES: What if we should first mix together the truest sections of each and see whether, in fact, they are adequate in their blended

141. An offering of honey and water is made to the Eumenides, Uranian Aphrodite, and other gods; for the Eumenides, see Sophocles *Oedipus at Colonus* 481.

142. A papyrus at Cologne has *poteron*, as Cornarius conjectured, which introduces a question with an alternative, rather than the manuscripts' *proteron*, which, if it is kept, would make the sentence run: "Come then first off: should we mix then every . . ." (cf. *Kölner Papyri* [P. Köln] [Opladen, 1980], 3: 48–53).

143. The Cologne papyrus has *alēthēs* (true), as Schleiermacher conjectured, not the *alēthōs* (truly) of the manuscripts. If the adverb is kept, the translation would be "is more truly a pleasure."

state to supply us productively with the most satisfactory life, or we should be in need of something further that is not of this kind?

62A PROTARCHUS: It seems to me at any rate that we should do so.

SOCRATES: Let's suppose there's some human being who is thoughtful about justice itself, in reflecting on what it is, and he has an account that goes along with his thinking, and, in general, he is thinking in just the same way about all the things that are.

PROTARCHUS: Let's suppose.

SOCRATES: Will he actually, then, be adequate in point of knowledge, if he has the account of the divine circle and sphere, but, in ignorance of this here human sphere and all the circles we have before us, he uses in housebuilding all the other instruments as standards in the same way as the [divine] circles are?¹⁴⁴

B

PROTARCHUS: We are speaking, Socrates, of a ridiculous disposition of ours if it is solely engaged in the divine sciences.

SOCRATES: What are you saying? Do you really mean that at the same time we have to interpolate in common and blend together the unstable and impure art of the false straightedge and circle?

PROTARCHUS: It's necessary, if in fact any one of us is going to find at any time the way home.

C

SOCRATES: And are we really to interpolate music as well? We spoke of it a little while ago as falling short of purity and being full of guesswork and imitation?¹⁴⁵

PROTARCHUS: It appears to me at least to be necessary, provided, that is, our life will ever be in any way whatsoever a life.

SOCRATES: Do you want me, then, just as if I were a doorkeeper who was being pushed and shoved by a crowd, to open up the doors and, in my utter defeat, let all the sciences flood in and allow the more deficient [science] to mix together with the pure?

D

PROTARCHUS: I at any rate, Socrates, don't know how one would be harmed should one take all the other sciences while keeping the first.

SOCRATES: So I am to let them all flood in into the receptacle of Homer's very poetic "confluence of glens?"¹⁴⁶

PROTARCHUS: Yes, of course.

144. The text is not easy, and it is possible that the last clause should read: "he uses in housebuilding and all other business the same straightedges and circles [as are appropriate for the divine shapes and figures]."

145. "Imitation" (*mimēsis*) is an allusion to *eikazein* at 55E, which was translated as "conjecture" but which means literally "to make a likeness."

146. *Misgagkeia* (*Iliad* 4.453), "confluence of glens," is indeed a unique formation in Greek, with the first element built on the ancient present radical of *meignumi* (to mix). The usual form for compounds is *m(e)ixo-*.

SOCRATES: They're in now. And once more we have to go back to the spring of pleasures. It proved to be impossible for us, as we had at first intended, to mix the proper parts of the true [pleasure and thought], but on account of our satisfaction with every kind of science we let them in en masse even before the pleasures. E

PROTARCHUS: What you say is most true.

SOCRATES: It's time, then, for the pair of us to deliberate as well about the pleasures: must all of them too be admitted en masse, or must the first we are to admit be all of them that are true?

PROTARCHUS: From the point of view of security, at least, it makes a great deal of difference to let in the true pleasures first.

SOCRATES: Let them in. But what's after this? Mustn't we actually, if there are some that are necessary and indispensable, just as in the case of knowledge, mix these together too?

PROTARCHUS: Certainly there can be no doubt about the necessary pleasures at least.

SOCRATES: And just as it was harmless or beneficial to know all the arts throughout one's life, are we now to say the same about the pleasures? That if it's advantageous or harmless for all of us to take pleasure in all pleasures throughout one's life, we must blend them all together. 63A

PROTARCHUS: How then are we to speak about this very point? And how are we to act [make]?

SOCRATES: We shouldn't ask ourselves, Protarchus, but rather the pleasures and thoughts themselves, and query them about each other like this—

PROTARCHUS: Like what? B

SOCRATES: "Dear friends, regardless of whether we must address you as pleasures or by some different name, would you choose to dwell with every kind of thought, or apart from being thoughtful?" I suspect that it's most necessary for them to say in reply to this the following.

PROTARCHUS: What?

SOCRATES: Just as was stated before, "For any genus in its purity to be alone and unsupported is scarcely either possible or beneficial, and we believe that, one for one, the genus of knowledge is the best of all genera to set up house with us, with knowledge of everything else as well as of each one of us as perfectly and completely as possible." ¹⁴⁷ C

147. Van Heusde suggested reading *kai autēn hautēn hēmōn* for *kai au tēn autēn hēmōn*, so that the phrase would run: "with knowledge of everything else and each of us with her own (self-)knowledge."

PROTARCHUS: And we shall say, "Now you have spoken beautifully."

SOCRATES: Right. Well, then, after this we have to question mind and thought once more. In questioning mind and thought in turn, we would say, "Do you actually have any further need of pleasures in the blending?" They would say perhaps, "What kinds of pleasures?"¹⁴⁸

PROTARCHUS: It's likely.

- D SOCRATES: And our speech after this is this: "In addition to those true pleasures," we shall say, "Do you actually have any further need for the greatest and the most extreme pleasures to be your house-mates?" "Just how could that be, Socrates?" perhaps they would say "inasmuch as they put in our way not only thousands upon thousands of impediments, by disturbing the souls in which we dwell through travails of frenzy,¹⁴⁹ but they also do not allow us to
- E come to be at all, and they absolutely corrupt for the most part the children born to us, by implanting forgetfulness on account of neglect and carelessness? But the pleasures you spoke of as true and pure, regard them as pretty nearly our own and at home with us, and besides them the pleasures that come with health and moderation, and, in general, mix in all those Pleasures who prove to be, as if she were a goddess, the attendants of Virtue entire and follow along with her everywhere; but those that come along with thoughtlessness and the rest of vice, surely it is a piece of overwhelming folly to mix them with mind, if one wants to try to learn in that mixture, in which one sees a mixing and blending as beautiful as possible and least subject to internal strife, what is by nature
- 64A good in man and in the whole, and what look (*idea*) one has to divine it is." Shall we actually say that mind in this present statement, on behalf of itself, memory, and right opinion, answered thoughtfully and fully in possession of itself?

PROTARCHUS: Absolutely.

SOCRATES: Yet this too is necessary, and otherwise not one thing would ever come to be.

- B PROTARCHUS: What?

SOCRATES: In whatever we shall not mix in truth, this would never truly come to be, any more than it would be once it became.

148. Were it not for Socrates' answer, one would think that the question was indignant: "What do you mean, pleasures?" Stallbaum, Paley, and Apelt took it this way.

149. "Travails of frenzy" (*manikas ödinas*) is Diēs's emendation for the manuscripts' "frenzied pleasures" (*manikas hēdonas*); Burnet deletes "pleasures" and emends *manikas* to *manias* (fits of madness).

PROTARCHUS: How could it?

SOCRATES: In no way. But you and Philebus say whether this kind of blending has a further need of something more. As for myself, the present account appears to have been produced as if it were some bodiless cosmos destined to rule beautifully an ensouled body.

PROTARCHUS: Well, Socrates, say that I too have settled into this opinion.

SOCRATES: Should we say, then, that we're now standing at the portico of the dwelling of the good, would we actually be speaking rightly in some way perhaps?¹⁵⁰

PROTARCHUS: It seems to me at any rate.

SOCRATES: What, then, would we think is the most honorable thing in this mixture and at the same time especially responsible for a disposition of this kind to have proved to be friendly and dear to us all? Once we see this, we'll go on to examine afterward whether in the whole it has taken on a composition that is more akin and closer in nature to pleasure or to mind.

PROTARCHUS: Right, for it is for us most useful for the judgment.

SOCRATES: And yet, in the case of every mixture at least, it's not difficult to see the cause on whose account any mixture whatsoever proves to be worth everything or altogether nothing.

PROTARCHUS: How do you mean?

SOCRATES: Surely not one human being is ignorant of it.

PROTARCHUS: Of what?

SOCRATES: That every way of blending whatsoever and of whatever kind, if it does not get measure and the commensurate nature, destroys of necessity the things being blended and first itself, for anything of the kind is not even a blending but truly an unblended mishmash, and on each and every occasion proves to be really and truly for those in possession of it a smashup.¹⁵¹

PROTARCHUS: Most true.

SOCRATES: Now the power [meaning] of the good has fled for us into the nature of the beautiful, for measuredness and commensuration surely turn out to be everywhere beauty and virtue.

150. This is Badham's text, accepted by Burnet. If we revert to the manuscripts, it reads: "we're now standing at the portico of the good and the dwelling of what is of that kind."

151. "Mishmash" and "smashup" are meant to convey the pun on *krasis sumpephorēmenē* and *sumphora*. *Sumphoreomai* means "to be jumbled together," and *sumphora* is any event, but usually a calamity. The literal sense of the verb would be "to be brought together" and of the noun "a coincidence." "Mishmash" and "mishap" would perhaps also convey the jingle. Manuscript W has *sumpephurmenē* (kneaded together) for *sumpephorēmenē*; the translation would not differ.

PROTARCHUS: Yes, of course.

SOCRATES: And we further said that truth has been mixed with them in the blend.

PROTARCHUS: Yes, sure.

65A SOCRATES: So if we are not able to track down the good with a single look (*idea*), but we comprehend it by three things—beauty, commensuration, and truth—let's say that we would most rightly charge them, just as if they were one, for the things in the mixture, and on account of it, on the grounds that it is good, say that the mixture has become of the same kind.

PROTARCHUS: Yes, most rightly.

B SOCRATES: Well, then, Protarchus, anyone whatsoever would be by now a competent judge for us of pleasure and thought, which of the pair is more akin to the best and which more honorable in the eyes of human beings and gods.

PROTARCHUS: Yes, it is clear, but still and all it's better to go through it in speech.

SOCRATES: Well, then, let us judge each of the three in relation to pleasure and mind one by one, for we must see to which of the two we shall assign each of the three as the more akin.

PROTARCHUS: You're speaking of beauty, truth, and measuredness?

C SOCRATES: Yes, Now first get hold of truth, Protarchus, and once you take it, look at the three—mind, truth, and pleasure—check yourself for a long time, and then answer for yourself whether pleasure or mind is more akin to truth.

D PROTARCHUS: But what need is there of time? The pair, I suspect, differs by a lot. Pleasure is the most boastful of all things, and, as the story goes, in sexual pleasures—they are thought to be the greatest—even the swearing of false oaths has obtained forgiveness from the gods, as if the pleasures were like children and possessed not even the smallest bit of mind. Mind, on the other hand, is either the same as truth or most like to it and truest.

SOCRATES: Then consider measuredness in the same way after this, whether pleasure possesses more of it than thought, or thought than pleasure.

PROTARCHUS: What you have proposed for consideration is as easy to consider. Just as one would not find, I suspect, any of the beings to be naturally more unmeasured than pleasure and exceeding gladness, so not one single thing ever to be more with measure than mind and science.

E SOCRATES: You've spoken beautifully. But all the same speak for the third time. Has mind for us partaken to a greater degree of beauty

than the genus of pleasure, so as for mind to be more beautiful than pleasure, or the contrary?

PROTARCHUS: Well, at least in the case of thought and mind, Socrates, no one, either in reality or in a dream, ever saw them or conceived of them in any way in any sense becoming, being, or about to be ugly [shameful]—

SOCRATES: Right.

PROTARCHUS: But surely pleasures, and what's more pretty nearly the greatest, whenever we see anyone whatsoever taking pleasure in them, because we see either the absurdity in them or the most shameless of all things going along with them, we ourselves are ashamed, and, in putting them out of sight, we hide them as best we can, and, on the grounds that light ought not to see them, we grant all things of the kind to night. 66A

SOCRATES: So in every way you will assert, Protarchus, sending it out by messengers and pointing it out to those in your presence, that pleasure is not the first or even the second acquisition, but for his first acquisition, we ought to hold, everyone has settled on a somewhat more pleasant choice—measure, the measured, the timely, and everything of the kind?¹⁵²

PROTARCHUS: On the basis of what is now being said, it at least appears so.

SOCRATES: And the second involves the commensurate and beautiful, the perfect and adequate, and everything that belongs in turn to this family. B

PROTARCHUS: It looks likely at any rate.

SOCRATES: Well, then, it's my divination that, should you set mind and thought in third place, you would not swerve greatly from the truth.

PROTARCHUS: Perhaps.

SOCRATES: Aren't, then, the fourth items, which we set down as belonging to the soul itself—sciences, arts, and the speeches of right opinions—aren't these (besides the three) the fourth, if, that is, they are more akin to the good than pleasure is? C

152. The text transmitted by the three main manuscripts cannot be construed, but W supplies in the margin a rather startling but perfectly intelligible reading, which Diès put in his text and I translate. If BTW's *tin aidion* (some eternal) is kept instead of W's *tina edion*—it looks like a simple itacism if W's marginal note is right—then *phusin* (nature) must be supplied from a late manuscript and the passage translated: "but we ought to hold that some eternal nature has chosen as the first acquisition something in the neighborhood of measure, the measured, the timely, and everything of the kind." This seems far too obscure.

PROTARCHUS: Perhaps.

SOCRATES: Well, then, the pleasures we set down as painless by definition are in fifth place, and we called them pure in belonging to the soul itself, going along with sciences, and some going along with sensations.¹⁵³

PROTARCHUS: Perhaps.

SOCRATES: "In the sixth generation," Orpheus says, "stop the cosmos of song";¹⁵⁴ and it's probable that our account too has ceased at the sixth judgment. So there's nothing for us after this except to give a head as it were to what has been stated.¹⁵⁵

D

PROTARCHUS: Then we must.

SOCRATES: Come then, for the third time, for the savior,¹⁵⁶ let us bear witness and go through the same account.

PROTARCHUS: Which exactly?

SOCRATES: Philebus was setting down the good for us to be pleasure entire and complete.

PROTARCHUS: So what you meant just now, Socrates, by the third time, it seems, was that we ought to resume the account from the beginning.

E

SOCRATES: Yes. Let's listen to what comes next. I caught sight of what I have just gone through, and in my disgust and revulsion at the speech not only of Philebus but of thousands and thousands of others, I said that mind was superior by far to pleasure at least and better for the life of human beings.

PROTARCHUS: That was so.

SOCRATES: But suspecting there were many different things as well, I said that if anything better than both of them were to come to light, I would join in an alliance with mind for second prize and battle through to the end against pleasure, and pleasure would be deprived of second prize as well.

67A

PROTARCHUS: You indeed said it.

153. Plato again (see n. 77 above) has dropped the particle *men*, so that the pleasures that go along with the sciences are suggested to be not necessarily different from those that go along with sensations.

154. According to M. L. West (*The Orphic Poems* [Oxford, 1983], 118), the six generations would be (1) Night; (2) Uranos and Ge (Earth); (3) Oceanus and Tethys; (4) Phorkys, Kronos, Rhea, and others; (5) Zeus, Hera, and others; and (6) everyone else.

155. "To give a head" seems to be a variant of a common expression "to put the head on the tale," which means to finish or round off a story or account.

156. The third cup of wine was dedicated to Zeus Savior (*sōter*), and the third time came to be regarded as the lucky time, when something was successfully accomplished.

SOCRATES: And after this, it came to light, in the most adequate of all ways, that neither of the pair was adequate.

PROTARCHUS: Most true.

SOCRATES: And in this argument both mind and pleasure were absolutely dismissed, and it was, as you know, settled that neither one of the pair, deprived as each was of self-sufficiency and the power of the adequate and complete, was at least the good in itself.

PROTARCHUS: Most right.

SOCRATES: But although a third and different kind came to light as superior to each of the pair, mind, in turn, has now come to light as more at home with and closer by nature—by the ten-thousandth degree at least—than pleasure to the look (*idea*) of the victor.

PROTARCHUS: Of course.

SOCRATES: Then mustn't it be the case, in conformity with the judgment that the argument now declared, that the power of pleasure be fifth?

PROTARCHUS: It looks like it.

SOCRATES: And it is not first, even if, by their pursuit of enjoyment, all the oxen and horses, and all other beasts together, declare and assert it to be so, and the many put their trust in them, as diviners do in birds, and, in point of our living well, judge the pleasures to be the most powerful and best, and they believe the authoritative witnesses are the desires (*erōtes*) of beasts rather than the desires of Speeches, who, in reliance on the philosophic Muse, have on several occasions uttered divinations. B

PROTARCHUS: All of us now assert, Socrates, that you have spoken most truly.

SOCRATES: Then you're letting me go?

PROTARCHUS: What still remains, Socrates, is a small thing, and surely you of all people will not give up before we do and fail to go the distance [the limit],¹⁵⁷ and I'll remind you of the remainder.

157. For this expression, see n. 8 above.